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Despite the importance of authenticity and sincerity in the public imagination, sociological 
investigation has been stymied by the murkiness of these concepts. In this dissertation, I clarify 
these concepts and situate them in a broader empirical literature. I then narrow my focus to 
investigate three questions related to the causes, consequences, and mediating role of perceived 
sincerity: What is the impact of perceived sincerity in exchange relationships? What informs 
these perceptions? And how does the study of perceived sincerity advance existing theoretical 
work in social exchange? I argue that prior explanations of reciprocity that refer to the norm of 
reciprocity fail to address the peculiarly human ability to perceive sincerity—i.e. to distinguish 
between others’ behavior and the ostensible motives that underlie others’ behavior. To address 
this shortcoming, I develop and test a theory predicting that perceptions of sincerity or the lack 
thereof have lasting consequences for the cohesion of emerging relationships. I also predict that 
recipients’ own dispositions, as well as the prevailing organizational culture, are critical 
determinants of perceived sincerity, informing the intentions that recipients ascribe to favor 
givers. Using a combination of experimental, interview, and survey data collected in the United 
States, India, and China, I find that 1) cohesion between exchange partners is far more contingent 
on perceived intentions than the observable “mechanics” of exchange emphasized in traditional 
explanations of reciprocity, and 2) those holding prosocial values reciprocate more than those 
 adhering to proself values, yet not because prosocial values suggest a general selflessness, but 
because they are associated with a greater tendency for perceiving others as sincere. Taken 
together, these findings constitute a social cognitive perspective of reciprocity that helps explain 
the development of long term solidarity in dyadic relationships, with implications for the study 
of teamwork and organizational behavior, institutions, and social networks more broadly. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“My product manager—he's a punk…He's pretty smarmy. He's flip-floppy. You know, 
he's that kind of guy who he says one thing to one person, and then you hear him say the 
exact opposite to somebody else. It just depends on who's in the room…he's kind of a 
schmoozey used car salesman kind of guy, you know, so he always smiles when he's 
talking to you. But at first I really liked him, you know, 'cause I thought he was kind of 
genuine. He has kind of a likeable personality. But then you get this kind of, ‘Oh, I see 
what you're at. You're just kind of an opportunist kind of guy.’" 
- GeoSoft engineer, interviewed for this dissertation 
  
Issues of authenticity and sincerity are fundamental to organizational life. Institutionally 
sanctioned objectives inevitably manifest in the personal interactions necessary to meet those 
objectives, resulting in sentiments like those expressed above. In particular, people in 
organizations are driven by self-interest to succeed in their roles, protect their jobs, increase their 
salary, and advance their careers (Baumeister 1989). The achievement of such self-interested 
endeavors is largely contingent on how people are perceived by others in the organization, 
causing people to actively manage their impressions while giving rise to questions of authenticity 
and sincerity. Am I compromising who I am? Am I believable? Is she believable? Is her 
helpfulness sincere? While people may have an aversion to feeling inauthentic, the demands of 
self-presentation permeate the most routine of interactions, as when a person reaches out to help 
another.  
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Existing research on social exchange—and in particular, research on reciprocity—has largely 
neglected the importance of such matters. I believe this oversight is due to two factors. First, 
authenticity and sincerity are murky terms in both vernacular and academic usages (Vannini 
2007). They are often used interchangeably and with ambiguous meanings. This imprecision has 
led to a variety of contradictory prescriptions. Some, for instance, suggest that the pursuit of 
authenticity is misguided (e.g. Patterson 2006), while others suggest it is critical to meaningful 
relationships (e.g. Deci and Flaste 1995). Authenticity’s sister concept, sincerity, can broadly 
mean mere truthfulness (e.g. the sincerity of a flattering remark) or more narrowly can refer to 
the alignment between one’s self-presentation and one’s self-concept (Erickson 1995).  
Second, reciprocity has largely been taken for granted by exchange theorists, with the 
implication that it is under-theorized (Molm 2010). Perhaps due to its roots in behaviorism, 
social exchange theory has traditionally addressed primarily the mechanics of exchange (e.g. 
resources, alternative partners; cf. Blau 1964; Emerson 1976) rather than more social cognitive 
factors, such as the perceptions of an exchange partner’s sincerity. With respect to why recipients 
choose to reciprocate favors, exchange theorists by and large point to the norm of reciprocity, a 
cultural “element” that when internalized causes people to experience a felt sense of obligation to 
reciprocate upon receiving a benefit (Gouldner 1960; Cialdini 1988; Flynn 2003). Evolutionary 
biologists have further argued that we are in fact biologically hardwired to feel such obligation 
due to its evolutionary advantages (Trivers 1971). Both of these explanations—normative and 
genetic—suggest that observable transfers of particularly-sized resources should inspire a 
corresponding transfer of a relatedly-sized resource. And both are limited by their inability to 
address the uniquely human capacity to distinguish between behavior and the intentions that may 
underlie behavior, or what can otherwise be called perceived sincerity. 
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This dissertation addresses each of these two factors in turn for the purpose of developing 
more precise predictions about real world exchange relationships. Chapter 2 is motivated by the 
assumption that rigorous investigation of authenticity and sincerity will continue to be stymied 
without clear distinctions and operationalizable definitions. My purpose in this chapter is thus to 
1) lay the conceptual groundwork necessary for conducting further research on authenticity and 
sincerity and 2) to demonstrate their critical role in people’s subjective experience of social life 
as well as the observable operations of social life more broadly. In Chapters 3 and 4, I restrict my 
focus to perceived sincerity, whereupon I develop and test a theory predicting the causes, 
consequences, and mediating role of perceived sincerity in reciprocal exchange relationships. 
The empirical findings from the studies in these chapters advance theoretical work in social 
exchange by demonstrating 1) the impact of perceived sincerity on reciprocity and cohesion in 
emerging relationships, 2) the factors that shape such perceptions of sincerity, and 3) the role 
perceived sincerity plays in explaining the relationship between prosocial values and reciprocity. 
Taken together, these findings constitute a social cognitive perspective of reciprocity that helps 
explain the development of long term solidarity in dyadic relationships, with implications for the 
study of teamwork and organizational behavior, institutions, and social networks more broadly. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In defining authenticity and sincerity in Chapter 2, I distinguish between “self” and “other” 
points of view to clarify both the concepts and the relevant literatures in which they are situated. 
Authenticity is defined as a felt sense of alignment with oneself (Trilling 1972). As a self-
referential concept, authenticity is solely experienced from the point of view of the self and not 
by others. Sincerity, by contrast, refers to the alignment between the self and one’s outward 
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expression (Erickson 1995) and thus can be experienced by both the self (the focus of impression 
management) or by others (the focus of authentication processes, whereby others assess the 
sincerity of target actors).  
Despite authenticity being a self-referential concept, the experience of (in)authenticity is 
influenced by one’s social environment, as the values and interests of others may or may not 
align with people’s self-definitions (Turner and Billings 1991). Nevertheless, some people may 
be more susceptible than others to experiencing inauthenticity in social contexts; in particular, 
people’s degree of comfort with respect to these social influences may be largely contingent 
upon where they “anchor” their “true” self (Turner 1976; Turner and Schutte 1981). Some may 
feel most authentic when highly embedded in social obligations, norms, social roles, and the like 
(this is referred to as an institutional anchorage), while others may feel most authentic when 
completely free of social constraints (impulsive anchorage).  
Regardless of one’s anchorage, research conducted by identity theorists and positive 
psychologists indicates that the experience of (in)authenticity is largely an emotional one 
(Erickson and Ritter 2001; Burke and Stets 1999; Harter 2002). In particular, authenticity is often 
associated with a variety of positive emotions, including satisfaction and enthusiasm, while 
inauthenticity is often associated with negative emotions, such as anxiety and discouragement 
(Lenton et al. 2012). Perhaps because of this emotional valence, people may be innately driven to 
experience authenticity (Swann 1983; Riley and Burke 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000).  
As with authenticity, sincerity is similarly influenced by social context (Goffman 1959). Yet 
whereas the effect of context on authenticity concerns one’s felt orientation with respect to one’s 
self-concept, the effect of context on sincerity concerns one’s self-presentation to others (Leary 
and Kowalski 1990). Research on emotional labor nevertheless suggests how authenticity, 
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sincerity and social context are all intertwined (Hochschild 1983). Most notably, this research 
indicates that insincere self-presentations can lead to a felt sense of inauthenticity, resulting in 
negative mental health outcomes such as burnout and depression (Erickson and Ritter 2001; 
Erickson and Wharton 1997).  
While studies of emotional labor approach sincerity from the point of view of the self, 
sincerity can also be approached from the point of view of the observer, as when individuals 
attempt to “authenticate” the sincerity of a target (Peterson 2005). Following Peterson, I use the 
term authentication to refer to the process by which observers attempt to vet a target’s sincerity 
via the target’s deliberate as well as unintentional expressions (Goffman 1959; Frank 1988). 
When authenticating a target, observers appear to pay foremost concern to the target’s ostensible 
intentions for engaging in the focal behavior (Reeder 2009; Reeder et al. 2004). Perceived 
intentions are of interest because they may provide clues as to the target’s self-values, which in 
turn make up the target’s self-concept (Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, and Trafimow 2002).  
In this respect, assessing a target’s sincerity is akin to assessing the target’s underlying 
intentions for engaging in a particular action (Simpson and Willer 2008). For targets that are 
engaged in prosocial behavior (such as offering help to a colleague), perceiving altruism as the 
underlying motive is akin to perceiving the target’s sincerity, since an attribution of altruistic 
motives accords with the target’s prosocial self-presentation. It is further worth noting that 
authenticating a target’s sincerity is equivalent to authenticating a target’s authenticity. In either 
case, the observer is attempting to understand the target’s intentions via their interpretation of the 
target’s self-presentation. Moreover, given that authentication involves vetting the sincerity or 
intentions of a target actor, I often use the terms perceived sincerity, perceived intentions, and 
perceived motives interchangeably. 
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Having situated authentication and perceived sincerity in this broader literature on 
authenticity and self-presentation, Chapters 3 and 4 empirically investigate authentication 
processes in social exchange. In particular, I focus on favor exchange (such as giving or 
receiving help to finish a project), given its routine occurrence and importance for organizational 
productivity (Flynn 2003). Moreover, favor exchange is also interesting for social scientists, as it 
poses a social dilemma (Kollock 1998). To maximize gains, self-interested recipients of favors 
should not return favors, and givers of favors who anticipate this reaction should refrain from 
giving favors in the first place—leaving both parties worse off.  
Theoretically, these chapters challenge existing explanations for reciprocity that attend to the 
observable mechanics of exchange rather than to social cognitive factors such as perceived 
intentions. In particular, I investigate three empirical questions regarding the causes, 
consequences, and mediating role of the perceptions recipients have of their exchange partners’ 
sincerity: What is the impact of such perceptions on recipients’ behavior? What informs these 
perceptions? And how does the study of perceived sincerity advance existing theoretical work on 
reciprocity?  
In Chapter 3, I investigate the consequences of perceived sincerity in one-shot exchanges 
between random strangers. I chose these conditions as they exaggerate the shortcomings of 
traditional economic models of reciprocity, which suggest that reciprocity should occur only 
when future interactions would allow recipients to reap the benefits of a cooperative reputation 
(Yamagishi et al. 2007). Nevertheless, despite the lack of potential reward, people commonly 
reciprocate under such circumstances (Yamagishi et al. 2007; Flynn and Brockner 2003). The 
most common explanation for this behavior in the exchange literature refers to the norm of 
reciprocity, which states that upon receiving help from others, people experience a felt sense of 
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obligation to provide help in return (Gouldner 1960; Cialdini 1988). According to this account, 
more substantial favors result in greater temporary inequities, which in turn amplify recipients’ 
desire to reciprocate out of obligation (Flynn 2003; Clark 1984). While this explanation assumes 
that recipients have internalized reciprocity norms, evolutionary biologists, in their more general 
theory of reciprocal altruism, have argued that adherence to reciprocity norms among genetically 
unrelated organisms incurs evolutionary advantages. After generations of exposure to selection 
pressures, many species—including humans—have thus become biologically hardwired to 
reciprocate prosocial behavior by restoring equity in their relationships (Trivers 1971; Axelrod 
and Hamilton 1981).  
In their emphasis on behavioral mechanisms, these explanations overlook the uniquely 
human capacity to distinguish between behavior and the motives that may underlie behavior, or 
what can otherwise be called perceived sincerity. Combining insights from both evolutionary 
biology and social science, recent research on gene-culture coevolution suggests that perceptions 
of ostensible motives may portend significant consequences for cooperative behavior such as 
reciprocity (Tomasello et al. 2005; Boyd and Richerson 2004; Gintis 2011). Inspired by this 
research, I develop and test a theory of reciprocity predicting how the intentions ascribed to favor 
givers have lasting consequences within emerging relationships. In particular, I suggest that 
perceiving givers as altruistically rather than egoistically motivated may cause recipients to feel a 
greater sense of cohesion with their partners. This cohesion manifests not only in greater 
reciprocity in the focal exchange, but inspires recipients to engage in unilaterally generous 
behavior with their partners should future interactions unexpectedly arise. In an online 
experiment, I found support for these predictions. As expected, relational cohesion mediated the 
relationship between perceived intentions and both reciprocity and future generosity. In line with 
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explanations of reciprocity that rely on reciprocity norms, I also found that the size of givers’ 
initial benefits impacted recipients’ reciprocity in the focal exchange but had no influence on 
recipients’ generosity in future unexpected interactions. Moreover, the size of givers’ benefits 
had no influence on recipients’ sense of relational cohesion with their partners. While supportive 
of reciprocity norm explanations that focus solely on the material aspects of exchange, these 
findings demonstrate the limited explanatory power of such explanations in predicting the 
development of commitment in emerging exchange relationships. These explanations suggest 
that relationships are “resolved” once recipients have restored equity with their exchange 
partners. In contrast, accounting for perceived motives allows us to make more precise 
predictions concerning reciprocity and the development of long-term solidarity. 
In Chapter 4, I turn from assessing the impact of perceived sincerity on reciprocity to 
investigating personal and situation factors that shape such perceptions. Drawing from research 
on the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, and House 1977; Krueger and Clement 1994) and 
social learning (Bandura 1977), I develop and test a theory predicting that people holding 
prosocial values, as well as members of groups that adhere to such values, will be more inclined 
to believe that others share their beneficent intentions. Possessing prosocial values at the 
individual or group level is thus expected to influence recipients’ likelihood of perceiving favor 
givers’ helpfulness as sincere.  
These predictions received empirical support in a cross-national survey of employees in a 
large multinational company. Furthermore, I found support for the prediction that the tendency to 
perceive others as sincere explains the link between prosocial values and reciprocity established 
in prior literature (Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; Triandis 1995; Chatman and Barsade 1995). 
Most explanations of this link suggest that prosocial values reflect a general concern for others, 
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implying that prosocial individuals as well as members of groups characterized by prosocial 
values are more likely to adhere to reciprocity norms (Chen, Chen and Meindl 1998; Perugini et 
al. 2003; Lester, Meglino and Korsgaard 2008). Yet in support of my prediction, I found that the 
relationship between prosocial values and reciprocity is best explained by the propensity for 
those holding prosocial values to view others as altruistically motivated. Since people tend to 
reciprocate more with others who appear to be motivated by altruism (as established in Chapter 
3), favor receivers with prosocial motives at either the individual or group level are more 
inclined to reciprocate. As argued in Chapter 4, such findings have practical implications for 
organizations wishing to improve workplace productivity. If reciprocity is attenuated by 
perceptions of favor givers’ self-interest and facilitated by receivers’ prosocial values, it may be 
more important for organizations to screen for prosocial values rather than to rely more 
exclusively on situational factors that promote teamwork.   
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CHAPTER 2 
AUTHENTICITY AND SINCERITY:  
“SELF” AND “OTHER” PERSPECTIVES 
 
This above all: to thine own self be true, and it must follow, as the night the day, thou cans’t not 
then be false to any man. 
- Polonius, from Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
 
"I couldn't care less whether my neighbors and co-workers are authentically sexist, racist or 
ageist. What matters is that they behave with civility and tolerance, obey the rules of social 
interaction and are sincere about it.  
- Orlando Patterson (2006), New York Times Op-Ed 
 
Authenticity and sincerity themes abound in popular discourse. PSY’s “Gangnam Style,” 
the most watched video in YouTube history with close to 1 billion views, is, for instance, a satire 
of insincere self-presentation.1 In the year preceding the 2008 U.S. presidential election, the New 
York Times published over 300 articles and blog posts referencing the authenticity or sincerity of 
Hillary Clinton; over 200 were published on Mitt Romney preceding the 2012 election. Urban 
slang is rife with authenticity references (“keeping it real”), while the ubiquitous injunction, “be 
yourself,” continues to be model advice for those entering into new and potentially 
uncomfortable situations. McLeod (1999) suggests that attention to authenticity is common in 
cultures “threatened” with assimilation (see also Peterson 2005; Trilling 1971), including a 
                                                
1 As PSY told CNN, “people who are actually from [the ‘hip’ Seoul district of] Gangnam never proclaim that they 
are—it’s only the posers and wannabes that put on these airs and say that they are—so this song is actually poking 
fun at those kinds of people who are trying so hard to be something that they’re not” (Cha 2012) 
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variety of niche music cultures that become “mainstream” as a result of their success (e.g. 
country, hip-hop) as well as broader ethnic cultures (e.g. African-American culture in the U.S.). 
In routine social interaction, authenticity and related concerns appear to be equally 
significant as in the arts and politics. The philosopher Charles Taylor cites the quest for 
authenticity as a defining trend of our time (Taylor 1992). Courses on self-presentation and 
authentic leadership are frequently taught in business schools. Books on authenticity and 
“personal branding” fill the virtual shelves of Amazon.com, with titles like “40 Days to 
Discovering the Real You: Learning to Live Authentically,” “Be Yourself, Everyone Else is 
Already Taken: Transform Your Life with the Power of Authenticity,” and “You Are a Brand! 
How Smart People Brand Themselves for Business Success.” These topics suggest ripe areas for 
sociological investigation, as they deal explicitly in the interactions between individuals and 
social context. Yet despite this promise and the ubiquity of authenticity and sincerity themes in 
popular discourse, authenticity and related concepts have received comparatively little recent 
attention in sociology (Franzese 2007; Vannini 2007). 
This neglect is likely due to the elusive character of these concepts, which can be 
considered on at least three fronts. First, authenticity is often used in reference to cultural objects, 
such as diamonds on the black market or Navajo paintings. Yet people have a complexity of self 
that objects lack, raising the question of which aspect of people does the term “authenticity” 
reference—their identity, their motives, their appearance, their talent?2 Second, social scientists 
historically have favored pursuing subjects such as inequality or social influence that can be 
readily observed. Frustrations by early scholars in the field that authenticity eludes measurement 
have persisted (cf. Brumbaugh 1971). The quest to define authenticity invariably involves an 
                                                
2 While object authenticity and personal ethnic authenticity are outside the scope of this paper, the intersection of the 
two has been a ripe area of research among anthropologists (Handler 2001). 
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investigation into the existence of a self—i.e. is there a “true” self, and if so, how is it 
experienced and conceptualized? Critiques by post-modernists and others that the self is a 
socially constructed invention further complicate matters. Third, authenticity and sincerity are 
elusive in an experiential sense as well. While sincerity is a highly valued commodity and critical 
to communicate to others, explicit efforts to appear genuine can undermine one’s perceived 
authenticity, as when political figures demonstrate heartfelt emotion for political gain. Sincerity 
is thus a unique asset that loses value when it is instrumentally sought; hence the saying, 
“sincerity—if you can fake that, you’ve got it made.”  
Despite this elusiveness, or perhaps because of it, the study of authenticity and sincerity 
tempts what Mills (1959) called the sociological imagination. Issues of authenticity and sincerity 
are at the nexus between self and society, amidst the interaction of individual sense-making and 
institutional structure. Indicative of these concerns, the first modern intellectual discussion of 
authenticity occurs in Sartre's (1944) essay about Jewish identity in 20th century Europe, a case 
where person and situation are at variance, to say the least. The "authentic Jew," for Sartre, is the 
Jew who "asserts his claim [i.e. his Jewish-ness] in the face of the disdain shown toward him.” 
As Erickson (1995) later observed, "people who make up the marginalized groups of a particular 
social context are more often faced with dilemmas that require them to choose between acting in 
accordance with their self-values or in accordance with the expectations of powerful others” (see 
also Steele 1990; Anzaldua 1987). In social life more broadly, these social expectations or norms 
often come into conflict with one’s values, thus challenging one’s sense of authenticity (Goffman 
1959; George 1998; Franzese 2007:47). 
This chapter reviews literature from sociology, psychology, philosophy, and critical 
theory to distinguish authenticity and sincerity. The purpose here is to clarify these concepts 
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while demonstrating their critical role in both people’s subjective experience of social life and 
the observable operations of social life more broadly. I begin with a historical overview of 
authenticity and sincerity that situates the concepts and related ideas against prevailing structural 
forces of key time periods. In the next section, I discuss authenticity from the point of view of 
the self, first defining authenticity with respect to the self-concept (including related ideas of the 
“true” self and self-concept anchorage), and then introducing an alternative framing of 
authenticity from self-determination theory. I conclude this discussion with a review of studies 
that investigate both the drive to seek authenticity and the benefits associated with its 
achievement. In the following section, I address the self in interaction. I first review literature on 
sincerity and self-presentation from the self’s point of view. I then switch points of view to 
discuss the authentication process, whereby people assess the sincerity of other’s self-
presentation. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of potential directions for future research. 
 
AUTHENTICITY AND SINCERITY THROUGH THE AGES 
 The word “authenticity” stems from the Greek authentikós, a root whose meaning of “one 
who does things himself” captures the word’s current usage by focusing on the importance of 
individual agency and autonomy. Yet authenticity is often confused with sincerity, both in casual 
conversation and academic scholarship (Erickson 1995). In a series of talks given at Harvard 
University in 1970 and recorded in his book Sincerity and Authenticity (Trilling 1971), the 
literary critic Lionel Trilling provided an apt distinction between these concepts. Authenticity, 
Trilling notes, is a self-referential concept, whereas sincerity concerns one’s social relations. In 
particular, authenticity refers to whether a person feels aligned with one’s sense of true self, 
while sincerity refers to whether a person represents herself truly or honestly to others (Erickson 
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1995; Gecas 1994; Handler 1986; Franzese 2007).  
 Using literary evidence as a guide, Trilling notes that interest in sincerity arose during the 
European Renaissance, predating popular discourse of authenticity by about 300 hundred years 
(see also Baumeister 1986). As Rousseau ([1755] 1972) speculated, dissemblance (insincerity) 
was foreign to pre-lingual individuals, who freely did as their natures compelled them to without 
a strategic manipulation of their self-presentation. This hypothesis has not been refuted by 
evolutionary biologists, who note that evidence of non-human primates engaging in deliberately 
deceptive behavior has only been documented anecdotally (Whiten and Byrne 1988; Ulbaek 
[1998] notes that “deception” techniques among other animals, such as that of a bird feigning a 
broken wing to ward off a predator, are likely non-conscious). Rousseau suggests that with the 
rise of civilization, “it…became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be 
and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp 
and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train” (Rousseau [1755] 
1972:86). During the Renaissance, literature ranging from Shakespeare to politics and 
philosophy depicts sincerity from the point of view of the observer rather than the target (self), 
with observers demonstrating concern about the potential incongruence between appearances 
(external behaviors and other signals or cues) and the target’s felt emotion. Baumeister (1986) 
speculates that religious movements may have played a role in this newfound attention given to 
sincerity, since the ability to go to heaven depended on regulating one’s actions in accord to 
religious creeds (cf. Weber [1905] 2001).  
 Beginning with the European Enlightenment in the 18th century, and particularly apparent 
in the writings of Rousseau, Trilling notes an escalation in the salience of authenticity in Western 
cultural discourse. Romantics of the period sought the essential self, and artists who appeared 
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most tapped into this authentic self were the most esteemed (Trilling 1971). In his 
characteristically essentialist style, Rousseau framed authenticity as “le sentiment de 
l’existence.” He further speculated that experiencing this “sentiment” comes from the 
autonomous pursuit of one’s own desires, which one can experience only in the absence of the 
modern trappings of conformity and other societal pressures (as discussed below, this conception 
of authenticity embodies what Turner (1976) refers to as an “impulsive” self-concept anchorage).  
Anthropologists, sociologists, and other cultural historians largely attribute the rise of 
authenticity during this period to the rise of commerce and the concomitant forces of 
rationalization and individualism (Trilling 1971; Taylor 1992; Weber [1922] 1968; Ritzer 2004). 
This shift—what Karl Polanyi referred to as the Great Transformation—was characterized by a 
shift from an economy characterized by redistribution, reciprocity, and householding to one 
characterized by more impersonal social contracts and relations (Polanyi 1957). This theme of 
moving away from local reciprocal exchange towards more impersonal market exchange appears 
in early sociological accounts of the Industrial Era (e.g. Durkheim [1933] 1965; Marx [1844] 
1988, [1867] 1976; Tönnies [1887] 2001). Durkheim similarly recognized a corresponding shift 
in the rules of law during the Enlightenment, noting that just as divinity had experienced a 
historical shift from the local to the transcendent (as animism gave way to earthly gods and 
finally the abstract residence of the Judeo-Christian God), legal structures that were “linked at 
first to local circumstances, to particularities, ethnic, climatic, etc.” began to “free themselves” of 
their context and in the process became “more general” (Durkheim [1933] 1965:289).   
Writing in the mid-1800s, Marx was concerned that in this new capitalist society, 
individuals were “simply and only conceived of as exchangers” and thus robbed of their life-
bearing essence ([1867] 1963). The utilitarian logic proffered by David Hume, Jeremy Bentham 
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and John Stuart Mill further reinforced this sentiment. Individuals were seen as motivated solely 
by their own material interests, and Adam Smith’s imagery of the invisible hand guiding such 
self-interested behavior to a greater social good suggested that individuals were operating in 
complete independence of other members of society. Marx ([1844] 1964) framed this state of 
affairs in terms of self-estrangement and alienation. Since Marx believed one’s work is 
inseparable from one’s true nature, he was concerned that industrialization and the loss of 
ownership of the production process isolated people from themselves.  
With respect to these developments, the philosopher Charles Taylor (1992) argues that 
prior to the Industrial Era, people were more intricately tied to a broad social fabric consisting of 
their geographic community and their spiritual brethren. These ties provided a self-conception 
that was rooted within a “cosmic order,” yet with the rise of modern capitalism, they gave way to 
a promise of social mobility that could transcend the operative power structures of the time. With 
this shift to a more vertiginous social orientation came a striving for personal authenticity, or the 
need to understand one’s place in the new social order. Taylor (1992) sees this development as a 
loss, noting that what was a byproduct of modernity transformed into a goal in and of itself. In 
characterizing what he refers to as the “dark side of individualism,” Taylor suggests that people 
have lost their “broader vision” of their place in their local culture. Instead, people now narrowly 
focus on their individual lives, thereby diminishing their concern for others and the larger 
collective. The modern instrumentally-driven society dislocates people from their sacred place in 
the great chain of being and reduces them to “raw materials or instruments for our projects” 
(Taylor 1992:5). The pursuit of authenticity, for Taylor, is misguided further, since human 
beings are “diological”—i.e. they evolve through relationships—such that attempting to identify 
the authentic self is a nonsensical activity at best, and at worst is a recipe for anomie and 
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isolation (Taylor 1992:34).  
 Subjective interpretations aside, if industrialization indeed disrupted the social fabric of 
everyday life, the rise of mass culture in the mid-twentieth century may have paradoxically 
provided a map to the new order. As Baumeister, Bell, and others have suggested, mass culture 
opened new doors for self-definition, and individuals increasingly faced new role opportunities 
and decisions, such that their identities became a matter of choice (Baumeister 1986; Bell 1976; 
Erickson 1995). This outcome—if causality can indeed be attributed—became the grist of the 
existentialist philosophers, whose discussions of authenticity suggested a way of resolving the 
tension between one’s conscious self and the pressures of the external world (Heidegger [1927] 
1996; Sartre 1956). Both Heidegger and Sartre framed inauthenticity as a form of self-neglect (or 
even self-deception) caused by a yielding to extrinsic pressures. According to Heidegger, living 
according to the will of others “ensnares” people in inauthenticity. For Sartre, inauthenticity 
results from losing touch with one’s own (as opposed to society’s) moral compass. Authenticity, 
both argue, is only possible when choices are grounded in the self.  
 In addition to the rise of mass culture, the latter half of the twentieth century was marked 
by a shift from an industrial to a service economy (Bell 1976). In contrast to the possibilities for 
identity construction brought about by the rise of mass culture, Hochschild (1983) has argued 
that the shift to a service economy has constrained individuals in the service sector from 
following their own moral compass, at least at work. Like the labor of Marx’s alienated 
industrial worker, the emotions of post-industrial service workers are similarly commoditized. 
For Hochschild, authenticity will continue to be a central concern for service workers so long as 
employers profit from the emotions of their employees. Hochschild’s (1983) study of flight 
attendants and bill collectors was the first rigorous empirical investigation into authenticity. In 
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recent years, scholars inspired by Hochschild have conducted additional research on emotional 
labor, demonstrating significant effects of inauthenticity and insincere self-presentations on job 
burnout and depression  (Erickson and Ritter 2001; Grandey 2003; see also Sloan 2007; Grant, 
Morales, and Sallaz 2009). 
 
AUTHENTICITY 
 In both sociological and psychological social psychology, the most prevalent 
conceptualization of authenticity refers to a felt sense of alignment with one’s “true” self  
(Hoffberg 2012a; Turner 1976; Gecas 1994; Erickson 1995; Harter 2002; Lenton et al. 2012). 
Unlike sincerity, which concerns the relationship between one’s internal experience and outward 
expression, authenticity is a self-referential concept, implying one’s own experience of oneself 
(Erickson 1995; Trilling 1971). In this section, I attempt to ground this somewhat abstruse 
conceptualization in theoretically meaningful and empirically measurable terms, by reviewing a 
diverse array of relevant literature, ranging from the self-concept (Turner 1976; Gecas 1982) and 
identity (Stets and Burke 2003) to emotions (Hochschild 1983; Erickson 1995) and motivation 
(Deci and Flaste 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000).  
First, I begin with a discussion of the self-concept and the “true” self—terms popularized 
by Turner (1976; Turner and Schutte 1981) that have become a significant focus in personality 
psychology (e.g. Cross, Gore, and Morris 203; English and Chen 2007; Wakslak et al. 2008)—
and discuss research indicating that the true self is primarily experienced affectively (Hochschild 
1983; Lenton et al. 2012; Burke 1991). Second, I discuss the relationship between the self-
concept and social context (Turner and Schutte 1981). As Turner believed the true self is best 
understood in relation to particular social environments (Turner and Billings 1991), he 
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distinguished between two “anchorages” where people locate their true selves: within social 
relations (institutional anchorage) and outside of social relations (impulsive anchorage). Turner 
developed measures for these anchorages and believed society was shifting towards a more 
impulsive anchorage (Turner and Schutte 1981). Third, I briefly review the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan 2000; Ryan and Deci 2000), which provides a 
complementary conceptualization of authenticity that focuses on one’s motivations and actions 
rather than one’s self-concept. Fourth, I review research from symbolic interactionism, identity 
theory, and positive psychology that suggests people are innately driven to feel aligned with their 
true selves and to seek environments that promote intrinsic motivation (Gecas 1986; Swann 
1983; Harter 2002). I conclude the section with a discussion of recent studies linking authenticity 
with particular mental health and behavioral outcomes (Burke 1991; Harter et al. 1996; Wood et 
al. 2008; Burris 2012). 
 
The Self Concept 
The self-concept is a “folk concept,” insofar as it refers to a subjective order that 
individuals attempt to impose on their own experience rather than some objective reality (Turner 
and Schutte 1981; Malle and Knobe 1997). In particular, the self-concept refers to “the 
conception an individual has of himself or herself” (Gecas 1991). Its utility, both for orienting 
one’s own experience and for scholarly study, lies in its relative stability and transituational 
quality. Nevertheless, the self-concept is also informed by interaction with one’s social 
environment, such that a “working copy” of self-views is reflexively informed by situations 
(Higgins 1987; English and Chen 2007; Burke 1980). This combination of stability and fluidity 
has posed a major challenge for researchers attempting to understand self-views (Erickson 1995). 
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Accounting for this complication, Turner (1976) defines the self-concept as “the continuity—
however imperfect—of an individual’s experience of himself in a variety of situations” 
(emphasis added).  
Identity theorists have argued that the self-concept is composed of multiple identities 
made salient depending on context (Stets and Burke 2003). These “role identities” can be ranked 
hierarchically, such that identities of higher rank are more likely to manifest in a given setting 
(McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1968, 1980). Network structure may influence this 
shuffling of identities, since behaviors are activated depending on one’s interaction partners. 
Homophilous networks, for example, may require a lower number of role identities while more 
diverse networks may increase the complexity of the self by expanding the number of operative 
identities (Smith-Lovin 2003). Despite this seeming disarray, the self-concept can be thought of 
as a “weaving” of multiple identities or of “self-values” that may sometimes be experienced 
coherently as one’s “true self” (Erickson 1995; Turner and Billings 1991; Gecas 1994). 
 Experimental, survey, and ethnographic studies suggest that the true self is indeed a 
robust experiential phenomenon, and notably one that is most apparent when it is violated 
(Lenton et al. 2012; Wood et al. 2008; Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, and King 2009; Hochschild 1983; 
Erickson 1995; Turner and Schutte 1981). The “true” self, like authenticity, refers to the self’s 
experience of alignment with the self-concept — i.e. “being true to oneself” (Gecas 1994). Even 
Goffman, who frames the self primarily as acting in response to cultural scripts, seemed to 
believe in the existence of a subjectively experienced true self (Schwalbe 1993; Goffman 1963). 
He acknowledges, for instance, that people can begin to identify with their own performances 
(1959:81-82) to the point where “a person comes to feel estranged from himself.” Elsewhere he 
notes that people’s pursuit of particular professions provides “a means of insulating their inner 
 25 
selves from contact with the audience” (20). Goffman further alludes to a core self when 
discussing self-deception, which “results when two different roles, performer and audience, 
come to be compressed into the same individual” (Goffman 1959:81). Sartre’s concept of “bad 
faith” (1956) is similarly couched in reference to a true self; people act in bad faith when they 
“conceal certain parts of themselves from themselves” (1944). Likewise, Hochschild (1983) 
suggests that whereas sincerity concerns fooling or not fooling others, authenticity concerns 
fooling or not fooling ourselves.  
 
Emotion 
If authenticity is the self's experience of the self, obvious methodological challenges arise 
in studying it. To complicate matters, people can experience (in)authenticity “without being able 
to make a clear statement of one’s identity” (Turner and Schutte 1981). Yet Turner and his 
colleagues suggest that because (in)authenticity is experienced affectively rather than cognitively, 
it can be measured by surveying people’s emotions (see also Hochschild 1983). Since emotion is 
far easier for a subject to identify than self-related cognitions, assessing the presence of 
(in)authenticity using emotions provides researchers empirical purchase on an otherwise elusive 
concept.  
Some authors speculate that (in)authenticity is a distinct emotion (e.g. Vannini 2006), yet 
there is little empirical evidence, if any, to support this. Most likely, authenticity and 
inauthenticity are subjective experiences that trigger positively and negatively valued emotions, 
respectively. Qualitative studies have shown that authenticity manifests in a positive affective 
state when people feel a congruence between a given situation and their values, preferences, and 
needs (Franzese 2007; Turner and Billings 1991; Vannini 2006). Inspired by Fridhandler’s 
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(1986:170) claim that “if a person is in a state he or she must be able to feel it,” Lenton et al 
(2012) measure authenticity via affect in both online and laboratory experiments. Their results 
correlate with those of qualitative studies, finding that participants associated authenticity with 
positive emotions (e.g. satisfaction, enthusiasm, enjoyment) and feeling inauthentic with 
negative emotions (e.g. anxiety, depression, discouragement).3 Empirical studies on identity 
theory have found similar emotional associations when the self-verification process is successful 
versus not (Burke 1991; Burke and Stets 1999).  
 
Social Context And Self-Concept Anchorage 
The experience of (in)authenticity is largely conditional upon one’s social environment 
since this experience is contingent on whether people’s perception of their true self is aligned 
with the values, interests, and demands of those around them (Turner 1976). Turner’s empirical 
approach to understanding authenticity and the subjective experience of the true self was thus to 
identify the social contexts in which people felt more or less “real”; by contrast, more direct 
queries about subjects’ true self failed to yield consistent data (Turner and Billings 1991).   
Using this method, Turner (1976; Turner and Schutte 1981; Turner and Gordon 1981) 
distinguishes between two dimensions, or “anchorages,” where people locate their real selves. 
Echoing Freud’s distinction between the id and the superego, Turner called these anchorages 
impulsive and institutional respectively. People with an impulsive self-concept anchorage feel 
most like their true selves in contexts that are free of social constraints and obligations. Finding 
institutional roles to be constraining (“cramping the expression of the true self”), impulsives 
                                                
3 Authenticity and inauthenticity were defined for participants in the following terms: “According to psychologists, 
the sense of authenticity is defined as ‘the sense or feeling that you are in alignment with your true, genuine self.’ In 
other words, the sense of authenticity is the feeling that you are being your real self.” “According to psychologists, 
the sense of inauthenticity is defined as ‘the sense or feeling that you are in alignment with an untrue, false self.’ In 
other words, the sense of inauthenticity is the feeling that you are not being your real self.” 
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prefer to “discover” their true selves by seeking “out of role” experiences (Turner 1976). By 
contrast, those with an institutional anchorage feel most like themselves when embedded in 
social obligations, norms, social roles and the like; institutionals prefer “sentiments and activities 
of an institutional and volitional nature, such as ambition, morality, and altruism.” Authenticity 
for institutionals is “achieved” rather than “discovered,” particularly through the pursuit of 
institutionalized goals. 
Turner’s distinction between impulsives and institutionals corresponds to the common 
distinction in psychology between two sets of cognitive processes that make up the self (Evans 
2008; Haidt 2006; Vaisey 2008). Haidt (2006) frames these processes using an elephant (Type 1) 
/ rider (Type 2) metaphor, whereby the “conscious, reasoning part of the mind [i.e. the rider] has 
only limited control of what the elephant [i.e. automatic processes] does.” Hochschild (1983) 
makes a similar analogy. After quoting a passage where a man is trying to quell his feelings of 
love for a woman who left him, Hochschild writes “these are almost like orders to a contrary 
horse (whoa, giddyup, steady now) [or] attempts to exhort feeling as if feeling can listen when it 
is talked to” (Hochschild 1983:39). In Turner’s typology, impulsives identify the animal as their 
true self, whereas institutionals identify the rider. Similarly, Evans (2008) cites over a dozen 
prominent dual process theories that frame the self using similar binaries (e.g. “automatic vs. 
controlled,” “associative vs. rule-based,” “impulsive vs. reflective”).4 Had Evans’ analysis 
covered sociologists, he would surely have included Turner’s self-concept anchorages.  
 To operationalize the anchorages and people’s felt experience of authenticity, Turner 
developed the “True Self Method” (Turner and Schutte 1981). This method consists of a series of 
open-ended questions that ask respondents to characterize the circumstances that promote their 
                                                
4 Similarly, while Freud located the self in the ego, Turner (1976) notes that many other of Freud’s contemporaries 
(e.g. Park 1927) thought that the real “home” of the self is the morally superior superego.  
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sense of authenticity and inauthenticity.5 Turner (1975) also developed a similar measure for 
survey research that has been used in quantitative studies of self-concept anchorage (e.g. Sloan 
2007).  
These methods were developed in large part to test Turner’s (1976) claim that society has 
been shifting from an institutional towards an impulsive locus of the self. Comparing prior 
studies that use similar measures (e.g. Kuhn and McPartland’s [1954] Twenty Statements Test) 
with his own results using the True Self Method, he found preliminary support for his hypothesis 
that impulsive anchorages have been on the rise since the 1950s, especially in college 
populations (Turner 1976; Turner and Gordon 1981). Yet recent studies of select populations 
suggest this trend may have been short lived (Sloan 2007; Hoffberg 2012b). For example, Sloan 
(2007) found that institutionals accounted for 65% of her random sample of 1,377 state workers; 
by contrast, institutionals comprised less than a third of the population sampled in Turner and 
Gordon’s 1981 study. As others have noted (cf. Pinker 2011:106-116), the 1960s through the 
1980s were characterized by a widespread rejection of institutionally sanctioned behavior, 
followed by a reversal leading to greater moral rectitude (see also Gecas 1994). Turner’s results 
are aligned with such explanations.  
 
Motivation / Action Framing 
 In addition to conceiving authenticity as an emotion-laden experience of the self-concept, 
authenticity is also used in reference to the self’s motivations and actions. This framing, most 
often found in research on self-determination theory, emphasizes outer manifestation rather than 
                                                
5 For example, one of the questions asks: “On some occasions my actions or feelings seem to express my true self 
much better than at other times. On these occasions the person that I really am shows clearly. I feel genuine and 
authentic. I feel that I know who I am. Try to recall one such occasion when your true self was expressed. Please 
describe the occasion and what you did or felt in detail.” 
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inner feeling (Deci and Flaste 1995; Ryan and Deci 2000; Deci and Ryan 2000). Both the self-
concept and motivation interpretations are complementary; in the final chapter of this 
dissertation, I discuss areas of potential research at their intersection.  
 With respect to motivation, authenticity refers to “being the author of one’s actions—
acting in accord with one’s true inner self ” (Deci and Flaste 1995:4, emphasis added). This 
conception mirrors Sartre’s (1956) view of authenticity as primarily tied to one’s choices. The 
emphasis here is on autonomy and self-determination; motivations themselves are authentic 
when they come from within a given actor.  
Authentic motivations (i.e. “intrinsic”) are thus manifestations of the self-concept (Gecas 
1982). They occur when one’s basic psychological needs of autonomy, perceived competence, 
and connection are met, allowing for engagement in an activity in the absence of any award aside 
form the activity itself (Deci and Ryan 1985:34). Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those that 
“people do naturally and spontaneously when they feel free to follow their inner interests” (Deci 
and Ryan 2000).  
 By contrast, extrinsic motivations refer to instrumental desires to engage in behaviors 
explicitly to achieve rewards or to avoid punishments. Unlike intrinsic motivation, the locus of 
causality for extrinsically motivated behavior is external to the self. For instance, an employee 
who offers a coworker help so as to win favor in the eyes of a supervisor is extrinsically 
motivated, as the reward (external to the act of providing help) induced the behavior. Extrinsic 
motivation reduces one’s sense of autonomy and thus impedes self-determination and 
authenticity (Ryan and Deci 2000).  
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Internal Drive Towards Authenticity 
 A core tenant of self-determination theory is that human beings have three innate 
psychological needs—for autonomy, competence, and connectedness—and are motivated to 
fulfill these needs. When these needs are met, intrinsic motivation and authenticity flourish 
(Ryan and Deci 2000; see also Etzioni 1968 and Nee 1998 for how structural conditions may 
catalyze intrinsic motivation). The presence of psychological needs suggests that people have an 
innate drive to experience authenticity (Gecas 1991). Scholarship on emotions associated with 
self-concept alignment lends support to this idea (cf. Swann 1983; Burke and Stets 1999; Gecas 
1986). For example, self-verification theory—which holds that the verified self is the authentic 
self (Swann, De La Ronde and Hixon 1994)—suggests that people are driven to verify, validate, 
and sustain their self-views (Swann 1983).  
Elsewhere, Gecas (1986, 1991, 1994) has theorized that authenticity is one of three 
primary motivations that stem from the self-concept, with the other two being self-esteem and 
self-efficacy. According to Gecas, people have an innate desire to experience their true selves 
and to avoid feelings of falseness. Other sociologists have echoed similar sentiments. Hochschild 
[1983:190], for instance, suggested that “people want to be their ‘authentic’ selves”, and Fine 
(2003:153) observed that the desire for authenticity "occupies a central position in contemporary 
culture.” This conception of authenticity as a self-motive may be attributed to (in)authenticy’s 
emotional charge. As Lenton et al. (2012) concluded from their experimental results, “state 
authenticity feels relatively good, and state inauthenticity feels relatively bad.” Other studies 
similarly suggest that self-consistency is a fundamental human motive, whereby individuals 
strive for a sense of identity-related coherence (Lecky 1945; Epstein 1973, 1980). Yet Gecas 
suggests that it is not self-consistency we strive for, since people can successfully manage 
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disparate belief systems (Thoits 2003); rather, people strive for meaning and avoid anomie.  
Along these lines, identity theorists have posited self-verification to be a motive 
attributed to the self, whereby people continually attempt to align their identities with their 
perceptions of the situation, and vice-versa (Swann 1983; Swann, Stein-Seroussi and Giesler 
1992; Riley and Burke 1995; Stets and Burke 2003). In other studies supporting this idea, Harter 
and colleagues (Harter 2012; Harter and Monsour 1992) have found that adolescents struggle 
with issues of false-self behavior and continually evaluate whether their behavior is consistent 
with their own desires, suggesting “that behaving authentically is a value, a goal toward which 
they aspire” (Harter 2002). 
 
 
Benefits Of Authenticity 
Perhaps such aspirations are for good reason. Sartre, who brought intellectual attention to 
the subject, posed authenticity as essential to well-being and morality (Sartre 1956). A variety of 
studies relating to identity theory, self-determination theory, and personality psychology have 
found support for this claim (Burke and Stets 1999; Deci and Ryan 2000; Wood et al. 2008). In 
broad terms, authenticity is typically associated with positively valued traits and inauthenticity 
with negatively valued traits. In their study of newly married couples, for example, Burke and 
Stets (1999) found that authenticity via self-verification leads to greater trust and subjective and 
behavioral commitment in the self’s relationship with others. Moreover, successful self-
verification manifests in positive affective states such as high self-esteem (Burke and Stets 1999; 
Cast and Burke 2002). When the self-verification process has gone awry, such that there’s an 
unresolved discrepancy between one’s perception of a situation and one’s relevant role identity, 
the resulting inauthenticity is apt to be experienced negatively as depression or distress (Burke 
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1991; Burke and Stets 1999), hostility (Cast and Burke 2002), or even anger (Bartels 1997). 
In their review of three decades of studies on self-determination theory, Deci and Ryan 
(2000) note that comparisons between people with intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation have 
shown that intrinsically motivated people have “more interest, excitement, and confidence, 
which in turn is manifest both as enhanced performance, persistence, and creativity … and as 
heightened vitality …, self-esteem …, and general well-being… This is so even when the people 
have the same level of perceived competence or self-efficacy for the activity." In support of these 
findings, other psychological studies similarly reveal associations between authenticity and 
positively valued traits, including self-esteem, positive affect, hope for the future, and self-
confidence (Harter et al. 1996; Snyder, Rand, and Sigmon 2002; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, 
and Ilardi 1997; Goldman and Kernis 2002; Lenton et al. 2012; Wood et al. 2008). By contrast, 
inauthenticity has been shown to correlate with depression, job burnout and lack of self-esteem 
(Harter et al. 1996; Erickson and Ritter 2001).  
Less common in the literature but nonetheless a ripe area for future research are studies 
demonstrating negative effects of authenticity and/or the utility of inauthenticity. With respect to 
authenticity, true-self behaviors in some contexts may elicit social sanctioning (Deci and Ryan 
1995; Kernis and Goldman 2006). For instance, studies on employee voice have shown that 
employees acting upon their personal values and beliefs can pay significant personal costs—such 
as poorer performance evaluations—when challenging the status quo (Burris 2012). Such 
behavior may result in negative emotions, despite experiencing these in conjunction with a felt 
sense of authenticity (Vannini 2006).  
Experiencing inauthenticity, on the other hand, may be beneficial in learning processes 
(Harter 2002). As Lerner (1993:16) observed, “sometimes pretending is a form of 
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experimentation or imitation that widens our experience and sense of possibility; it reflects a 
wish to find ourselves in order to be ourselves.” Along these lines, research on self-determination 
theory similarly suggests that despite their association with inauthenticity, behaviors that initially 
feel extrinsically motivated or rewarded can be integrated with the self over time and, given a 
sufficiently supportive environment, may be brought into congruence with one’s other values 
and needs (Ryan and Deci 2000).  
 
SELF-PRESENTATION: SINCERITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SELF 
In social interaction, the image of self that individuals present to others may or may not 
align with the individuals’ own experience of their true self. The degree of alignment is referred 
to as the individuals’ “sincerity” (Trilling 1971).6 While some have framed this alignment as a 
form of authenticity (Kernis and Goldman [2006], for instance, call this “relational 
authenticity”), I follow Trilling (1971:2), who defines sincerity as “a congruence between 
avowal and actual feeling,” and Erickson (1995), who frames sincerity as “a congruence between 
one’s outward appearance and the underlying reality of the self” (see also Simpson and Willer 
2008 for similar usage).  
 Sociological study of self-presentation and sincerity emerged in the work of Goffman 
(1959, 1963), who characterized sincere individuals as those “who believe in the impression 
fostered by their own performance” (1959:18).7 Goffman frames the self as almost entirely 
constructed through interaction, where sincerity is a derivative of performance rather than vice 
                                                
6 Sincerity can of course broadly apply beyond the domain of the self-concept (e.g. the sincerity of a flattering 
remark to another).  
7 I use the term self-presentation rather than impression management, as the former necessarily implies self-relevant 
depictions, whereas impression management does not (Schlenker 1980; Schneider 1981). 
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versa.8 Insincerity, he writes elsewhere, occurs when an individual “adheres to the obligation of 
maintaining a working consensus and participates in different routines or performs a given part 
before different audiences” (1959:81). Goffman’s emphasis on performance appears to discount 
the potential for truthfully conveying one’s real motivations; he attends to the active work one 
does to manage an audience’s impressions rather than whether such impressions are reflective of 
one’s subjectively perceived self-concept. This perspective is evident in his distinction between 
the “front stage” of human interaction and the “backstage,” the latter being “a place, relative to a 
given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted 
as a matter of course” (1959:112, emphasis added).  Perhaps due to Goffman’s influence, 
sociologists often frame self-presentation as a form of theatrical deceit (e.g. Franzese 2007).  
Yet recent work in psychological social psychology suggests that people consciously 
manage the impressions they give off for a variety of reasons, which may or may not involve 
deliberate deception (Leary and Kowalski 1990). In their review of the literature on self-relevant 
impression management, Leary and Kowalski suggest five factors—evident in the work of 
Goffman and others—that may influence one’s self-presentation: 1) the self-concept, 2) the 
idealized self, 3) the self’s current or potential social image, 4) the values and interests of a target 
observer, and 5) the self’s role identity within a particular context. While the first two factors are 
intrinsic to the self, the latter three are contingent on the external environment. Nevertheless, all 
five factors combine to influence the image that people attempt to convey to others. For instance, 
a product manager who enthusiastically helps his supervisor may be embodying all five factors, 
since helpfulness embodies a core self-value (1) that is also reflective of the manager’s idealized 
self (2); the manager may also be upholding his reputation for helpfulness (3) while being 
                                                
8 Critical of Goffman on this account, Hochschild (1983:217) writes, “from no other author do we get such an 
appreciation of the imperialism of rules and such a hazy glimpse of an internally developed self.” 
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mindful of his supervisor’s needs (4) and his own professional role as a “team player” (5). 
 
The Influence of Social Context on the Sincerity-Authenticity Relationship 
Social context can thus significantly influence both one’s authenticity (felt sense of 
alignment with oneself) and sincerity (alignment between self and outward expression). The 
social pressures suggested by Leary and Kowalski’s latter three factors challenge the pursuit of 
sincerity and provide friction to the internal drive towards authenticity discussed in the previous 
section; to the degree that these pressures are peripheral to one’s self-values, they restrict 
autonomy, self-determination, and authenticity (Deci and Ryan 2000). This is not to say that 
inauthenticity and insincerity are inevitable byproducts of social interaction. Yet when strong 
social norms prevail, sincere self-presentation in accordance with these norms may come about 
only when the prevailing norms have been internalized. According to self-determination theory, 
this internalization—what Deci and Ryan (2000) refer to as a “deep, holistic processing”—
occurs when individuals are psychologically free of pressures to behave in a certain way.  
People’s attempts at adhering to social etiquette and other norms for “fitting in” can 
illustrate this relationship between sincerity and authenticity (Goffman 1963). For instance, there 
are strong norms of how to act at a funeral; the expectations embodied by these norms may 
restrict the development or manifestation of more intrinsically motivated behavior (Leary and 
Allen 2011). As Goffman writes, these occasions possess “a distinctive ethos, a spirit, an 
emotional structure, that must be properly created, sustained, and laid to rest, [with] the 
participant finding that he is obliged to become caught up in the occasion, whatever his personal 
feelings” (1963:19; emphasis added). When “personal feelings” conflict with a situation’s 
emotion norms, individuals are likely to form negative self-judgments that may have a bearing 
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on one’s felt sense of authenticity (Thoits 1985).  
The sincerity-authenticity connection is also prominent in groups with a strong group 
identity, given that group members may become depersonalized as they attempt to align 
themselves with group prototypes (Hogg 2001). In such cases, particular member behavior may 
be rewarded or punished based on members’ alignment with the group’s identity, such that 
alignment itself becomes an extrinsic motivator. As group identity increases in salience, intrinsic 
motivation may be further diminished (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).   
 
Emotional Labor 
Hochschild’s (1983) investigation of emotional labor among airline stewardesses is 
perhaps the most in-depth study of social context and its influence on the sincerity-authenticity 
relationship. Emotional labor arises when a given social environment is at odds with one’s 
personal values and interests, thereby creating a tension between one’s self-concept and one’s 
self-presentation. In Hochschild’s words, the term specifically refers to “the management of 
feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display” (1983:7).  
Hochschild casts emotional labor in a negative light, suggesting it is detrimental to well-
being and leads to job burnout. The ultimate culprit, she explains, is post-industrial capitalism: 
“perhaps it does take a capitalist sort of incentive system to connect emotional labor to 
competition and to go so far as to actually advertise a ‘sincere’ smile, train workers to produce 
such a smile, supervise their production of it, and then forge a link between this activity and 
corporate profit” (Hochschild 1983:186). While Goffman noted that people act sincerely all the 
time due to social incentives, Hochschild’s point is that capitalism allows employers to profit 
from it. Echoing Marx, Hochschild’s phrase, “the managed heart,” reflects the impact of 
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structural forces on private authenticity. Yet whereas Marx attributed workers’ alienation to the 
shift towards industrial modes of production, Hochschild’s concerns largely reflect the rise in 
service-sector work brought on by post-industrialization.9  
To engage in emotional labor, service workers either surface act or deep act. Surface 
acting entails mimicking affective displays while deep acting involves conjuring inner feelings 
that align with desired affective displays (Hochschild 1983; Grove and Fisk 1990). Deep acting 
is still acting—or “faking” (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987)—because the inner feelings are 
deliberately conjured without necessarily reframing one’s self-concept. Importantly, the 
intentions behind surface and deep acting are notably different (Grandey 2003). Those who 
engage in deep acting are attempting to appear authentic to the observer; this method has thus 
been called “faking in good faith” (Rafaeli and Sutton 1987). Workers who merely engage in 
surface acting (“faking in bad faith”) have little empathetic intent to assist the observer; they fake 
to maintain their job (Grandey 2003).  
Hochschild suggests that surface acting results in greater inauthenticity than deep acting, 
given the tension (“emotional dissonance”) between inner feelings and outward expression. 
Subsequent studies have confirmed this prediction, suggesting that the negative effects of 
emotional labor occur only when such labor is superficially enacted (see also Stets 2012). 
Several studies attribute more positive outcomes to deep acting relative to surface acting 
(Grandey 2003; Erickson and Wharton 1997; Ekman, Friesen, and O’Sullivan 1988). Ekman and 
colleagues (1988), for instance, have shown that surface acting, relative to deep acting, is 
negatively perceived when detected by observers. Erickson and Wharton (1997) demonstrated 
surface acting to be associated with job burnout and depression (see also Brotheridge and 
                                                
9 Note that emotional labor has also been studied outside of service roles; for example, Grant, Morales, and Sallaz 
(2009) found that employees engage in emotional labor following organizational change initiatives.  
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Grandey 2002), and Grandey (2003) further found that deep acting is not associated with the 
stress that surface acting is. Moreover, relative to deep acting, surface acting is more strongly 
correlated with “breaking character” rather than with successful affective delivery (Grandey 
2003). Not surprisingly, Grandey found that service workers who are less satisfied with their jobs 
are more likely to surface act rather than deep act, creating a reinforcing cycle whereby surface 
acting generates more emotional dissonance, which leads to greater stress and job burnout. 
 
 
AUTHENTICATION: SINCERITY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OTHERS 
Authentication refers to the process of confirming that a target’s self-presentation 
accurately reflects the target’s genuine interests and motivations (Peterson 2005). Whereas the 
previous discussion of emotional labor concerned authenticity and sincerity from the point of 
view of the self (e.g. the flight attendants), this section covers these concepts from the point of 
view of others (e.g. the passengers). I do not distinguish between authenticating a target’s 
authenticity and authenticating a target’s sincerity; in either case, the observer is attempting to 
understand the target’s values, motivations, and beliefs via their interpretation of the target’s 
self-presentation. From the point of view of others, the terms authenticity and sincerity are thus 
often used interchangeably. 
In public-facing professions, such as music performance and politics, authenticating 
processes are commonplace (Peterson 2005; Barker and Taylor 2007; McLeod 1999; Merkin 
2007). Musicians, for instance, whose performances are thought to be extrinsically motivated 
rather than arising from within the self-concept are derisively categorized as having “sold out” 
(Barker and Taylor 2005; McLeod 1999). Perhaps because fans are seeking an emotional 
connection with artists (Peterson 2005), musicians castigated as sell-outs are treated as trust 
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violators or moral transgressors (Hughes 1992). As Barker and Taylor (2007:xi) note: “especially 
in the music aimed at white teenage males, authenticity is seen as the sine qua non of artistic 
success.” As if to heighten the stakes, many musicians—especially those in hip-hop, punk, and 
grunge—situate their identity in opposition to commercial mainstream. With the suicide of 
Nirvana’s Kurt Cobain as a case in point, the inauthenticity experienced by these artists can be 
unbearable when their commercial success challenges their long-standing values (Barker and 
Taylor 2007). At least in the performing arts, authenticity can thus be a double-edged sword: 
perceived authenticity may bring success, and success raises the potential of either being cast as 
a sell-out, or of feeling like one.  
The entertainment business aside, the need to authenticate others in routine social 
interactions is well documented (Ames, Flynn, and Weber 2004; Goffman 1959; Read and Miller 
1993; see also Chapter 3 of this dissertation). Developmental psychologists have demonstrated 
that authentication processes begin early in life; by the age of two, children have begun 
understanding the intentions of others (Mele 2001; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). This behavior, 
known as mind-reading or theory of mind, may run deep in evolutionary makeup, as being able 
to understand others’ underlying intentions helps us understand who can be relied upon to form 
mutually beneficial relationships (see Chapter 3 of this dissertation, as well as Cosmides 1989). 
As Goffman (1959:1) observed, “information about the individual helps to define the situation, 
enabling others to know in advance what he will expect of them and what they may expect of 
him. Informed in these ways, the others will know how best to act in order to call forth a desired 
response from him.” Authentication thus reduces the observers’ cognitive load by predicting a 
target’s behavior, which in turn can inform the observers’ own behavior and propensity for 
cooperation (Read and Miller 1993; Frank 1988; Swann 1983; see also Chapter 3 of this 
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dissertation).  
Several studies have demonstrated these consequences of the authentication process 
(Ames, Flynn, and Weber 2004; Frank, Ekman, and Friesen 1993; Grandey et al. 2005; see also 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation). For instance, people with sincere affective displays are rated more 
positively than those with insincere displays, as such displays are likely suggestive of a target’s 
underlying intentions (e.g. Frank, Ekman, and Friesen 1993; Grandey et al. 2005; Frank 1988). 
Armed with information about the meaning of the target’s actions, observers can 
correspondingly adjust their own behavior (Ames, Flynn, and Weber 2004; see also Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation). In the study reported in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I found that recipients of 
favors indeed adjusted their actions according to the intentions they attribute to their exchange 
partners. Not only did recipients reciprocate more with favor givers perceived to have altruistic 
rather than egoistic intentions, recipients were also more inclined to engage in generous behavior 
towards such partners when a future encounter unexpectedly arose.   
Observers pay attention to two forms of expressions when authenticating a target: 
expressions “given” and expressions “given off” (Goffman 1959), or what signaling theorists call 
signals and cues, respectively (Donath 2007; Frank 1988). Both types are outward manifestations 
of inner motives and conditions, and as such, they provide observers with the most salient clues 
as to whether a target’s self-presentation is aligned with his or her self-values.  Expressions given 
(signals) are those that are consciously performed on the front stage of human interaction. 
Because they reflect intentional behavior, they provide clues as to the objectives, motives, and 
mental states of the target actor (Reeder 2009). Expressions given off (cues) are the unintentional 
cues that one does not control; they therefore can serve as the most reliable indicators of what is 
truly happening “backstage” (Goffman 1959).  
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Erickson (1995) suggests that when observers authenticate a target’s expressions (both 
given and given off), observers tend to be seeking information suggestive of the target’s 
motivations. A target’s motivations are of particular interest for observers insofar as they reflect 
the target’s self-values, which in turn make up the target’s self-concept. In a series of studies, 
Reeder and colleagues found support for this claim, finding that motive attributions may play a 
far greater role in observers’ decisions than the situational and dispositional factors that have 
become the primary focus of attribution theory (Reeder 2009; Reeder et al. 2004; Reeder, 
Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, and Trafimow 2002; Reeder, Pryor, Wohl and Griswell 2005; see also 
Malle 1999). Reeder (Reeder et al. 2004) has demonstrated that perceiving others’ motives is a 
central process of impression formation. For instance, perceiving another as having selfish 
motives informed general trait attributions of helpfulness. This finding accords with speculations 
by early attributions theorists, who believed motive attributions were antecedents of dispositional 
attributions (e.g. Jones and Davis 1965; see Reeder 2009).  
In their awareness that outward expressions yield such valuable information, targets may 
attempt to strategically manipulate both their signals and cues so as to create desired 
impressions. Cues, for which the target actor “seems to have little concern or control,” are the 
more costly to manipulate because they require studied technique to maintain their appearance as 
unintentional (Goffman 1959:7; Frank 1988). This costliness suggests that cues rather than 
signals are more reliable indicators of underlying intentions. This reliability in turn makes them 
the most desirable for a target to strategically manipulate, so long as the target is able to maintain 
the unintentional appearance of such expressions (Jones and Pittman 1982; Leary and Kowalski 
1990). These payoffs provoke a game of sorts, whereby targets attempt to manipulate their 
behavior to achieve desired impressions, and observers (themselves impression managers in their 
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own right) are continually identifying new ways to spot put-on impressions. Goffman (1959:8-9) 
believed observers have the upper hand in this game, noting that “the arts of piercing an 
individual’s effort at calculated unintentionality” are more perfected than people’s capacity to 
manipulate their own behavior. This weakness on the part of targets may be due to the extreme 
costliness (i.e. difficulty) of mimicking certain facial cues that reflect underlying emotional states 
(Frank 1988:121). 
While targets may have their own difficulties in shaping desired self-presentations, 
observers have a different set of challenges due to perceptual biases that shape how the motives 
of targets are perceived. For instance, observers may make positive attributions to those who 
support the observers’ viewpoints (Reeder et al. 2005) or to others who compliment them (Vonk 
2002). Perhaps the most studied bias is the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, and House 
1977; Marks and Miller 1987; Krueger and Clement 1994), which refers to people’s tendency to 
overestimate the prevalence of their own attributes—including their intentions, values, and 
preferences—in others. The robustness of this bias has been shown in experiments demonstrating 
that people will continue to hold false consensus beliefs even after engaging in de-biasing efforts 
through feedback and education, such as being shown the statistical errors of their attributions 
(Krueger and Clement 1994). While the false consensus effect suggests that people project their 
own values onto others, social learning processes may cause people to project values of their 
group onto others as well (Bandura 1977). In a study of organizational employees, Hoffberg 
(Chapter 4 of this dissertation) found that employees projected both their own values and the 
values of their group onto fictional colleagues. Such biases can have significant consequences on 
group behavior, since perceived values can influence reciprocity and the development of long-
term solidarity.  
 43 
REFERENCES 
Anzaldúa, Gloria. 1987. Borderlands: The New Mestiza = La Frontera. San Francisco: 
Spinsters/Aunt Lute. 
Bandura, A. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Barker, H., and Y. Taylor. 2007. Faking it: The Quest for Authenticity in Popular Music. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Bartels, D. J. 1997. An Examination of the Primary Emotions of Anger and Sadness in Marriage 
within the Context of Identity Theory. Unpublished Dissertation. Washington State 
University. 
Baumeister, Roy F. 1986. Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bell, Daniel,. 1976. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Brotheridge, C. M., and A. A. Grandey. 2002. "Emotional Labor and Burnout: Comparing Two 
Perspectives of “people Work”." Journal of Vocational Behavior 60 (1):17-39. 
Brumbaugh, R. 1971. "Authenticity and Theories of Administrative Behavior." Administrative 
Science Quarterly 16 (1):108-112. 
Burke, P. J. 1991. "Identity Processes and Social Stress." American Sociological Review 836-
849. 
———. 1980. "The Self: Measurement Requirements from an Interactionist Perspective." Social 
Psychology Quarterly 18-29. 
Burke, P., and J. Stets. 1999. "Trust and Commitment through Self-Verification." Social 
Psychology Quarterly 62 (4):347-366. 
Burris, E. 2012. "The Risks and Rewards of Speaking Up- Managerial Responses to Employee 
Voice." Academy of Management Journal 55 (4):851-875. 
Cast, Alicia D., and Peter Burke. 2002. "A Theory of Self-Esteem." Social Forces 80 (3):1041-
1068. 
Cha, Frances. 2012. "Interview: PSY on 'Gangnam Style', Posers and that Hysterical Little Boy. 
Link: http://travel.Cnn.com/seoul/play/interview-Psy-Gangnam-Style-Posers-and-
Hysterical-Little-Boy-285626." CNN.com (August 17) 
Cosmides, L. 1989. "The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped how Humans 
Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task." Cognition 31 (3):187-276. 
Cross, Susan E., Jonathan S. Gore, and Michael L. Morris. 2003. "The Relational-Interdependent 
Self-Construal, Self-Concept Consistency, and Well-being." Journal of Personality and 
 44 
Social Psychology 85 (5):933-944. 
Deci, E. L., and R. M. Ryan. 2000. "The "what" and "Why" of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and 
the Self-Determination of Behavior." Psychological Inquiry 11 (Part 4):227-268. 
Deci, Edward L., and Richard Flaste. 1995. Why we do what we do: Understanding Self-
Motivation. New York: Penguins Books. 
Deci, Edward L., and Richard M. Ryan. 1985. Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in 
Human Behavior. New York: Plenum. 
Donath, J. 2007."Signals, Cues and Meaning." in Signals, Truth and Design, edited by 
Anonymous. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Durkheim, Emile. [1933] 1965. Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press. 
Ekman, P., W. V. Friesen, and M. O'Sullivan. 1988. "Smiles when Lying." Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 54 (3):414. 
English, Tammy, and Serena Chen. 2007. "Culture and Self-Concept Stability: Consistency 
Across and within Contexts among Asian Americans and European Americans." Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 93 (3):478-490. 
Epstein, S. 1973. "The Self-Concept Revisited: Or a Theory of a Theory." American 
Psychologist 28 (5):404. 
———. 1980. "The Self-Concept: A Review and the Proposal of an Integrated Theory of 
Personality." Personality: Basic Aspects and Current Research 81-132. 
Erickson, R. 1995. "The Importance of Authenticity for Self and Society." Symbolic 
Interaction 18 (2):121-144. 
Erickson, R., and C. Ritter. 2001. "Emotional Labor, Burnout, and Inauthenticity: Does Gender 
Matter?" Social Psychology Quarterly 64 (2):146-163. 
Erickson, R., and A. S. Wharton. 1997. "Inauthenticity and Depression: Assessing the 
Consequences of Interactive Service Work." Work and Occupations 24 (2):188-213. 
Etzioni, A. 1968. "Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Inauthenticity." American Sociological 
Review 33 (6):870-885. 
Evans, Jonathan St B. T. 2008. "Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social 
Cognition." Annual Review of Psychology 59 (1):255-278. 
Fine, G. A. 2003. "Crafting Authenticity: The Validation of Identity in Self-Taught Art." Theory 
and Society 32 (2):153-180. 
Frank, M., P. Ekman, and W. Friesen. 1993. "Behavioral Markers and Recognizability of the 
Smile of Enjoyment." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64 (1):83-93. 
Frank, Robert H. 1988. Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions. New York: 
 45 
Norton. 
Franzese, A. 2007. To Thine Own Self Be True? An Exploration of Authenticity. Unpublished 
Dissertation. Duke University. 
Fridhandler, Bram M. 1986. "Conceptual Note on State, Trait, and the State-Trait 
Distinction." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 50 (1):169-174. 
Gecas, V. 1994."In Search of the Real Self: Problems of Authenticity in Modern Times." Pp. 
139-154 in Self, Collective Behavior, and Society: Essays Honoring the Contributions of 
Ralph H. Turner, edited by G. Platt, and C. Gordon. Greenwich, CT: 
———. 1982. "The Self-Concept." Annual Review of Sociology 8 1-33. 
———. 1991."Self-Concept as a Basis for a Theory of Motivation." Pp. 171-187 in The Self-
Society Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion and Action, edited by J. Howard, and P. Callero. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
George, L. K. 1998. "Self and Identity in Later Life: Protecting and Enhancing the Self." Journal 
of Aging and Identity 3 (3):133-152. 
Gergen, Kenneth J. 1991. The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Goffman, Erving. 1963. Behavior in Public Places; Notes on the Social Organization of 
Gatherings. New York: Free Press of Glencoe. 
———. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 
Goldman, B. M., and M. H. Kernis. 2002. "The Role of Authenticity in Healthy Psychological 
Functioning and Subjective Well-being." Annals of the American Psychotherapy 
Association 5 (6):18-20. 
Grandey, Alicia A. 2003. "When the show must Go on: Surface Acting and Deep Acting as 
Determinants of Emotional Exhaustion and Peer-Rated Service Delivery." Academy of 
Management Journal 46 (1):86-96. 
Grandey, Alicia A., et al. 2005. "Is ``service with a Smile'' enough? Authenticity of Positive 
Displays during Service Encounters." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 96 (1):38-55. 
Grant, Don, Alfonso Morales, and Jeffrey J. Sallaz. 2009. "Pathways to Meaning: A New 
Approach to Studying Emotions at Work." American Journal of Sociology 115 (2):327-
364. 
Haidt, J. 2006. The Happiness Hypothesis. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Handler, R. 2001. "Anthropology of Authenticity." International Encyclopedia of the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences 963-967. 
Handler, R. 1986. "Authenticity." Anthropology Today 2 (1):2-4. 
 46 
Harter S, et al. 1996. "A Model of the Effects of Perceived Parent and Peer Support on 
Adolescent False Self Behavior." Child Development 67 (2):360-74. 
Harter, S. 1983. "Developmental Perspectives on the Self-System." Handbook of Child 
Psychology 4 275-385. 
Harter, S., and A. Monsour. 1992. "Development Analysis of Conflict Caused by Opposing 
Attributes in the Adolescent Self-Portrait." Developmental Psychology 28 (2):251. 
Harter, S. 2002."Authenticity." Pp. 382-394 in Handbook of Positive Psychology, edited by C.R. 
Snyder. Oxford [England]; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Heidegger, Martin. [1927] 1996. Being and Time. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press. 
Higgins, E. T. 1987. "Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect." Psychological 
Review 94 (3):319. 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Hoffberg, M.D. 2012a. "Authenticity." in Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, edited by G. 
Ritzer. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hoffberg, M.D. 2012. Prosocial Values, Reciprocity, and the Mediating Role of Perceived 
Motives in Favor Exchange. Unpublished Data. 
Hogg, M. 2001."Social Categorization, Depersonalization, and Group Behavior." Pp. 56-87 
in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes, edited by M.A. Hogg, 
and R.S. Tindale. Malden, Mass. ; Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hughes, Patrick. 1992. "Girl You Know it's Industry: Milli Vanilli and the Industrialization of 
Popular Music." Popular Music and Society 16 (3):39. 
Jones, E. E., and K. E. Davis. 1965. "A Theory of Correspondent Inferences: From Acts to 
Dispositions." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2 219-266. 
Jones, E.E., and T.S. Pittman. 1982."Toward a General Theory of Strategic Self-Presentation." 
Pp. 231-262 in Psychological Perspectives on the Self, edited by J. Suls. Hillsdale, NJ: 
Elbaum. 
Kádár, Dániel Z., and Sara Mills. 2011. Politeness in East Asia. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kernis, Michael H., and Brian M. Goldman. 2006. "A Multicomponent Conceptualization of 
Authenticity: Theory and Research." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 
283-357. 
Krueger, J., and R. W. Clement. 1994. "The Truly False Consensus Effect: An Ineradicable and 
Egocentric Bias in Social Perception." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67 
(4):596. 
 47 
Kuhn, M. H., and T. S. McPartland. 1954. "An Empirical Investigation of Self-
Attitudes." American Sociological Review 68-76. 
Leary, Mark R., and Ashley Batts Allen. 2011. "Self-Presentational Persona: Simultaneous 
Management of Multiple Impressions." Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 101 (5):1033-1049. 
Leary, Mark R., and Robin M. Kowalski. 1990. "Impression Management: A Literature Review 
and Two-Component Model." Psychological Bulletin 107 (1):34-47. 
Lecky, P. 1945. Self-Consistency; a Theory of Personality. New York: Island Press. 
Lenton, Alison P., et al. 2012. "How does being Real Feel? the Experience of State 
Authenticity." Journal of Personality doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00805.x (print 
edition not yet published) 
Lerner, H. 1993. The Dance of Deception: Pretending and Truth Telling in Women's Lives. New 
York: Harper Collins. 
Malle, B. F. 1999. "How People Explain Behavior: A New Theoretical Framework." Personality 
and Social Psychology Review 3 (1):23-48. 
Marks, G., and N. Miller. 1987. "10 Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect - an 
Empirical and Theoretical Review." Psychological Bulletin 102 (1):72-90. 
Marx, Karl. [1867] 1963. Capital. New York: International. 
———. [1844] 1964. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. New York: International 
Publishers. 
McCall, G. J., and J. L. Simmons. 1978. Identities and Interactions: An Examination of Human 
Associations in Everyday Life (Rev. Ed.). New York: Free Press. 
McLeod, K. 1999. "Authenticity within Hip-Hop and Other Cultures Threatened with 
Assimilation." Journal of Communication 49 (4):1-17. 
Mele, A. 2001."Acting Intentionally: Probing Folk Notions." Pp. 27-43 in Intentions and 
Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, edited by B.F. Malle, and L.J. Moses. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Meltzoff, A.N., and R. Brooks. 2001.""Like Me” as a Building Block for Understanding Other 
Minds: Bodily Acts, Attention, and Intention." Pp. 171-191 in Intentions and 
Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, edited by B.F. Malle, and L.J. Moses. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Merkin, D. 2007. "The Politics of Appearance." New York Times Style Magazine (August 
26):307-309. 
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nee, V. 1998. "Norms and Networks in Economic and Organizational Performance." The 
 48 
American Economic Review 88 (2):85-89. 
Park, R. E. 1927. "Human Nature and Collective Behavior." American Journal of Sociology 32 
(5):733-741. 
Patterson, O. 2006. "Our Overrated Inner Self." New York Times Section A; Column 6; Editorial 
Desk (December 26):35. 
Peterson, R. 2005. "In Search of Authenticity." Journal of Management Studies 42 (5):1083-
1098. 
Pinker, S. 2011. The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined. New York, NY: 
Penguin Books. 
Polanyi, Karl. 1957. Trade and Market in the Early Empires; Economies in History and Theory. 
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. 
Portes, Alejandro, and Julia Sensenbrenner. 1993. "Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on 
the Social Determinants of Economic Action." The American Journal of Sociology 98 
(6):1320-1350. 
Rafaeli, A., and R. I. Sutton. 1987. "Expression of Emotion as Part of the Work Role." Academy 
of Management Review 23-37. 
Read, S. J., and L. C. Miller. 1993. "Rapist Or" Regular Guy": Explanatory Coherence in the 
Construction of Mental Models of Others." Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin 19 (5):526-540. 
Reeder, G. D., et al. 2005. "On Attributing Negative Motives to Others Who Disagree with our 
Opinions." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31 (11):1498-1510. 
Reeder, G.D., and D. Trafimow. 2005."Attributing Motives to Other People." Pp. 106-123 
in Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Divide between Self and Others, edited by B. 
Malle, and S. Hodges. New York: Guilford Press. 
Reeder, Glenn D. 2009. "Mindreading: Judgments about Intentionality and Motives in 
Dispositional Inference." Psychological Inquiry 20 (1):1-18. 
Reeder, Glenn D., et al. 2002. "Inferences about the Morality of an Aggressor: The Role of 
Perceived Motive." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (4):789-803. 
Reeder, Glenn D., et al. 2004. "Dispositional Attribution: Multiple Inferences about Motive-
Related Traits." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 86 (4):530-544. 
Riley, A., and P. J. Burke. 1995. "Identities and Self-Verification in the Small Group." Social 
Psychology Quterly 61-73. 
Ritzer, George. 2004. The McDonaldization of Society. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Pine Forge Press. 
Ross, L., D. Greene, and P. House. 1977. "False Consensus Effect - Egocentric Bias in Social-
Perception and Attribution Processes." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 13 
 49 
(3):279-301. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [1755] 1972. The Social Contract. (Harmondsworth): Penguin. 
Ryan, Richard M., and Edward L. Deci. 2000. "Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation 
of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-being." The American 
Psychologist 55 (1):68. 
Sartre, J. P. 1944. Anti-Semite and Jew. New York: Schocken Books. 
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1956. Being and Nothingness; an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. New 
York: Philosophical Library. 
Schlegel, Rebecca J., et al. 2009. "Thine Own Self: True Self-Concept Accessibility and 
Meaning in Life." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96 (2):473-490. 
Schlenker, B. R. 1980. Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social Identity, and 
Interpersonal Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company. 
Schneider, D.J. 1981."Tactical Self-Presentations: Toward a Broader Conception." Pp. 23-40 
in Impression Management Theory and Social Psychological Research, edited by J.T. 
Tedeschi. New York: Academic Press. 
Schwalbe, M. 1993. "Goffman Against Postmodernism- Emotion and the Reality of the 
Self." Symbolic Interaction 1-10. 
Schwalbe, Michael, et al. 2000. "Generic Processes in the Reproduction of Inequality: An 
Interactionist Analysis." Social Forces 79 (2):419-452. 
Simpson, Brent, and Robb Willer. 2008. "Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interaction of 
Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior." Social Psychology Quarterly 71 (1):37-52. 
Sloan, M. 2007. "The Real Self and Inauthenticity; the Importance of Self-Concept 
Anchorage." Social Psychology Quarterly 70 (3):305-318. 
Smith-Lovin, L. 2003."Self, Identity, and Interaction in an Ecology of Identities." Pp. 167-178 
in Advances in Identity Theory and Research, edited by P.J. Burke, T.J. Owens, R.T. 
Serpe, and P. Thoits. New York: Springer. 
Snyder, C., K.L. Rand, and D.R. Sigmon. 2002."Hope Theory." Pp. 257-276 in Handbook of 
Positive Psychology, edited by C.R. Snyder. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Steele, Shelby. 1990. The Content of our Character: A New Vision of Race in America. New 
York: St. Martin's Press. 
Stets, J. E. 2012. "Current Emotion Research in Sociology: Advances in the Discipline." Emotion 
Review 4 (3):326-334. 
Stets, J., and P. Burke. 2003."A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity." Pp. 128-152 
in Handbook of Self and Identity, edited by M.R. Leary, and J. Tangney. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
 50 
Stryker, S. 1968. "Identity Salience and Role Performance: The Relevance of Symbolic 
Interaction Theory for Family Research." Journal of Marriage and the Family 558-564. 
———. 1980. Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Menlo Park, CA: 
Benjamin/Cummings Publishing Company. 
Swann Jr, W.B. 1983."Self-Verification: Bringing Social Reality into Harmony with the Self." 
Pp. 33-66 in Psychological Perspectives on the Self (Vol. 2), edited by J. Suls, and A.G. 
Greenwald. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Swann, W. B., A. Stein-Seroussi, and R. B. Giesler. 1992. "Why People Self-Verify." Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 62 (3):392. 
Swann, W., C. De La Ronde, and J. G. Hixon. 1994. "Authenticity and Positivity Strivings in 
Marriage and Courtship." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66 (5):857-869. 
Taylor, Charles,. 1992. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Thoits, P. 2003."Personal Agency in the Accumulation of Role-Identities." Pp. 179-194 
in Advances in Identity Theory and Research, edited by P.J. Burke, T.J. Owens, R.T. 
Serpe, and P. Thoits. New York: Springer. 
Thoits, Peggy A. 1985. "Self-Labeling Processes in Mental Illness: The Role of Emotional 
Deviance." The American Journal of Sociology 91 (2):221-249. 
Trilling, Lionel. 1972. Sincerity and Authenticity. Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press. 
Turner, R.H., and S. Gordon. 1981."The Boundaries of the Self: The Relationship of 
Authenticity in the Self-Conception." Pp. 39-57 in Self-Concept: Advances in Theory and 
Research, edited by M.D. Lynch, A. Norem-Hebeisen, and K. Gergen. Cambridge, MA: 
Ballinger. 
Turner, R. 1975. "Is there a Quest for Identity?" Sociological Quarterly 16 (2):1-15. 
Turner, R., and V. Billings. 1991."The Social Contexts of Self-Feeling." Pp. 103-122 in The Self-
Society Dynamic: Cognition, Emotion and Action, edited by J. Howard, and P. Callero. 
Cambridge [Engliand]; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Turner, R., and J. Schutte. 1981. "True Self Method for Studying the Self-Conception." Symbolic 
Interaction 4 (1):1-12. 
Turner, R. H. 1976. "The Real Self: From Institution to Impulse." American Journal of 
Sociology 81 (5):989-1016. 
Ulbaek, I. 1998."The Origin of Language and Cognition." in Approaches to the Evolution of 
Language, edited by J.R. Hurford, Michael Studdert-Kennedy, and Chris Knight. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Vaisey, Stephen. 2008. "Socrates, Skinner, and Aristotle: Three Ways of Thinking about Culture 
in Action 1." Sociological Forum 23 (3):603-613. 
 51 
Vannini, P. 2007. "The Changing Meanings of Authenticity." Studies in Symbolic Interaction 29 
63-90. 
———. 2006. "Dead Poets' Society: Teaching, Publish-Or-Perish, and Professors' Experiences 
of Authenticity." Symbolic Interaction 29 (2):235-257. 
Vonk, R. 2002. "Self-Serving Interpretations of Flattery: Why Ingratiation Works." Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 82 (4):515. 
Wakslak, Cheryl J., et al. 2008. "Representations of the Self in the Near and Distant 
Future." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (4):757-773. 
Weber, Max. [1922] 1968. Economy and Society. Berkeley: U. Cal. Press. 
———. [1905] 2001. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Captalism. London ; New York: 
Routledge. 
Whiten, A., and R. W. Byrne. 1988. "Tactical Deception in Primates." Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 11 (02):233-244. 
Wood, Alex M., et al. 2008. "The Authentic Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Conceptualization and the Development of the Authenticity Scale." Journal of 
Counseling Psychology 55 (3):385-399. 
 
  
 52 
CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECT OF PERCEIVED INTENTIONS  
ON DIRECT RECIPROCITY AND FUTURE GENEROSITY 
 
People often reciprocate help with utter strangers, even when there is no potential for 
future interaction. While such actions characterize our most idealistic notions of altruism, 
numerous experiments have shown this behavior to be commonplace among majorities of 
laboratory subjects (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr 2003; Yamagishi et 
al. 2007). Reciprocity under these circumstances confounds traditional economic and game 
theoretic assumption of individual rationality, which predicts reciprocity should occur only when 
future interactions would allow recipients to reap the benefits of a cooperative reputation 
(Axelrod 1980). Yet people unfailingly reciprocate favors when their identities are anonymous 
and future interaction is impossible (Hayashi et al. 1999; Kiyonari et al. 2000; Watabe et al. 
1996; Cho and Choi 1999). As these conditions prevent altruistic behavior for the purposes of 
social maneuvering, they provide a stark illustration of how traditional economic models of 
human interaction fall short and how such simple interactions help to address the Hobbesian 
problem of social order.   
To explain people’s propensity to reciprocate under such extreme conditions, exchange 
theorists by and large have pointed to the norm of reciprocity, a cultural “element” that when 
internalized causes people to experience a felt sense of obligation to reciprocate upon receiving a 
benefit (Gouldner 1960). Evolutionary biologists have argued that we are in fact biologically 
hardwired to feel such obligation due to its evolutionary advantages (Trivers 1971). Both of 
these explanations—normative and genetic—suggest that observable transfers of particularly-
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sized resources should inspire a corresponding transfer of a relatedly-sized resource. Yet in their 
emphasis on behavioral mechanisms, a significant limitation is their inability to account for the 
uniquely human capacity to distinguish between behavior and the intentions that may underlie 
behavior. More recent scholarship at the intersection of evolutionary biology and social science 
on gene-culture coevolution suggests that such distinctions may portend significant 
consequences for cooperative behavior such as reciprocity (Tomasello et al. 2005; Feldman and 
Zhivotovsky 1992; Boyd and Richerson 2004; Gintis et al. 2003; Gintis 2011). 
In this paper, I outline the limitations of behavior-contingent reciprocity—both 
theoretically as an explanation for reciprocal behavior and empirically as a potential foundation 
for developing long-term cohesion and solidarity—while demonstrating the complementary 
importance of reciprocity contingent on recipients’ perceptions of givers’ intentions. Bringing 
together theoretical research on evolutionary fitness and empirical social exchange research on 
relational cohesion, I develop three fundamental arguments: 1) recipients’ perception of givers’ 
intentions should influence both recipients’ reciprocity and their future generosity towards givers 
beyond the focal exchange, 2) relational cohesion, by way of social emotions, should mediate 
these effects, and 3) whereas the perceived intentions of givers in a focal exchange should 
influence recipients’ future generosity, givers’ actual behavior (the magnitude of their favor) in 
the focal exchange should not. I test these predictions in an anonymous online environment that 
inherently precludes the possibility of future interaction. 
This paper attempts to make three main theoretical contributions. First, prior studies of 
prosocial behavior have supported the belief that “actions matter, not intentions” when 
considering the consequences for engaging in prosocial behavior (Ames, Flynn, and Weber 
2004). The present study illustrates the fallacy of such thinking. I find empirical support for the 
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argument that despite observing the same prosocial “actions,” recipients will invariably adjust 
their reciprocal behavior depending upon the intentions they perceive to be driving those actions. 
Second, prior genetic and normative explanations of reciprocity fail to explain how cooperative 
behavior may extend beyond the focal exchange. The present study demonstrates how greater 
relational cohesion as a result of perceiving givers as altruistically motivated will inspire 
recipients to engage in generous behavior towards their partners should future encounters 
unexpectedly arise. Lastly, prior social exchange research, and most theorizing in sociology for 
that matter, has neglected the formative role of human evolution (Massey 2002; Machalek and 
Martin 2004). In detailing the evolutionary logic of reciprocity and how emotions help to reify 
cooperative relationships, this paper responds to Massey’s call for research that accounts for both 
rationality and our “preexisting emotional base.”  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The Puzzle of Reciprocity 
Reciprocity occurs when one person helps another in response to receiving a benefit 
(Blau 1964). In direct exchange in particular, reciprocity is non-negotiated and oriented towards 
the original giver, rather than towards a third party as in indirect exchange (Sahlins 1972; Molm 
et al. 2007). Both the act of reciprocity and the initial prosocial act that inspired reciprocity are 
forms of cooperation, insofar as they represent costly behavior that increases the welfare of 
others (Boyd and Richerson 2009). For givers, the cost is positively correlated with the benefit 
provided and with the risk that their help will not be reciprocated; recipients, for their part, have 
already reaped their benefits, thus rendering reciprocity itself costly when potential future 
encounters are unlikely. 
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Given the costs of reciprocating, economically-rational recipients should thus hoard the 
benefits they receive rather than reciprocating them. Yet reciprocity is commonplace, even in the 
absence of potential future interaction (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr 
2003; Yamagishi et al. 2007). In laboratory experiments examining this phenomenon, reciprocity 
is often defined as cooperating in a prisoners’ dilemma game, whereby participants are paired 
with a partner and are given a choice of whether to cooperate or not cooperate (“defect”) with 
their partner (Schino and Aureli 2010). Both participants and their partners must make this 
choice, and in games where reciprocity is the focal behavior, this choice is made sequentially. 
According to the game’s payoff structure, first-movers who cooperate risk receiving the lowest 
payoff, since second-movers may defect and reap the maximum reward; unilateral cooperation 
will reap the highest collective benefit, while unilateral defection the least.  
If the game is repeated, second-movers may cooperate to build a reputation as 
cooperative, perhaps with the goal of defecting on a later round (Axelrod 1980). But second-
movers in laboratory experiments routinely cooperate even in one-shot games with no such 
“shadow of the future.” For instance, in sequential one-shot PD games where the first-mover 
cooperated, 61% of American participants (Hayashi et al. 1999), 62% to 75% of Japanese 
participants (Kiyonari et al. 2000; Watabe et al. 1996), and 73% of Korean participants (Cho and 
Choi 1999) acting as the second mover chose to cooperate. In all of these cases, participants 
knowingly reaped a lower benefit by reciprocating cooperation than they would have received if 
they had defected. 
Predominant explanations of such findings have pointed to the normative and genetic 
basis for this form of cooperation. In the following sections, I address these explanations briefly 
in turn and then shift attention to the emerging “gene-culture coevolution” scholarship that 
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suggests a symbiotic relationship between genetic selection and cooperative norms provided the 
basis for costly cooperative behavior such as reciprocity. While the norm- and gene-based 
arguments emphasized the contingency of reciprocity on givers’ actions, the gene-culture 
coevolution model suggests that recipients’ perceptions of givers’ intentions may be equally 
consequential. Drawing from recent empirical work on social exchange, I explain the influence 
of perceived intentions on reciprocity and future generosity by accounting for the presence of 
social emotions that reinforce relational cohesion and inspire cooperative behavior. 
 
Explaining reciprocity 
The de facto account of reciprocity in social exchange scholarship (cf. Buchan, Croson, 
and Dawes 2002; Kuwabara 2011) refers to the norm of reciprocity, which holds that people 
reciprocate out of a felt sense of obligation or indebtedness upon receiving an initial benefit 
(Gouldner 1960; Cialdini 1988). In his original thesis, Gouldner framed the norm of reciprocity 
as “an element of culture,” a prescriptive necessary to social order that mitigates opportunism 
when two parties engage in exchange: “when internalized in both parties, the norm obliges the 
one who has first received a benefit to repay it at some time; it thus provides some realistic 
grounds for confidence, in the one who first parts with his valuables, that he will be repaid.” 
While a convincing description of reciprocity in human populations, Gouldner’s account does 
not address why this norm is ubiquitous in nearly every human society, merely that it is. 
In developing the theory of reciprocal altruism, Trivers (1971) addressed this 
shortcoming by outlining the reproductive advantages for individuals that adhere to reciprocity 
norms, with the implication that reciprocity has become biologically hard-wired in our genetic 
makeup. The theory of reciprocal altruism suggests that social organisms (not just humans, but 
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also other cooperative organisms such as cleaner shrimp and vampire bats; cf. Wilkinson 1984) 
operate under the principle of “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”—i.e. recipients 
reciprocate as a form of payback for receiving an initial benefit. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) 
subsequently explained how this behavior can become evolutionary stable in small groups with 
weak levels of kin selection. In recent years however, reciprocal altruism as an explanation for 
cooperation has come under criticism. Simulations of large populations, for instance, have shown 
that reciprocal altruism cannot account for the evolution of reciprocity in larger groups more 
common in early hominid societies (Gintis 2009, 2011; Boyd and Richerson 1988, 1992, 2009; 
Gardner and West 2004). Moreover, the theory does not explain the widespread finding that 
humans will reciprocate even under conditions of anonymity with no potential for future 
interaction (Gintis et al. 2003). 
Over the last decade, the idea that both norms and genes co-evolved to facilitate 
cooperation in human groups has been gaining widespread acceptance among evolutionary 
biologists as an explanation for why humans cooperate even in the absence of potential future 
rewards (Feldman and Zhivotovsky 1992; Boyd and Richerson 2004; Gintis et al. 2003; Gintis 
2011; Ihara 2011; Wilson 2012a). This research suggests that while those harboring cooperative 
genes may indeed have achieved greater reproductive success, human cultures simultaneously 
evolved to be more cooperative, and such environments in turn favored the reproduction of 
prosocial genes (Gintis 2011; Wilson 2012a). In this respect, both genes and culture promoting 
cooperation co-evolved in a process similar to Pinker’s (1994) account of the early evolution of 
language acquisition, whereby human’s functional ability to process language emerged along 
with cultural properties that facilitated transmission (Boyd and Richerson 2009).10  
                                                
10 An example of such coevolution in promoting cooperation is outlined by the cooperative eye hypothesis 
(Tomasello et al. 2007; Tomasello 2009). Experiments have demonstrated that the large, white sclera in human eyes 
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Gene-culture coevolution is congruent with the theory of multilevel selection, which 
holds that both individual and group selection effects influenced human evolution (Wilson 
2012a; Traulsen and Nowak 2006; Nowak, Tarnita, and Wilson 2010). According to this theory, 
the onset of culture allowed humans to rapidly adapt to local environments. Such adaptations 
created stable variation in local groups that were competing for resources; and groups with 
cultures that facilitated cooperation won out over those that did not (Gintis 2011). Inherent in this 
cultural fabric of cooperative groups were “new social instincts suited to life in such groups, 
including a psychology which ‘expects’ life to be structured by moral norms… Individuals 
lacking the new social instincts more often violated prevailing norms and experienced adverse 
selection” (Boyd and Richerson 2009). Deviants within such cultures—ostracized or otherwise 
deprived of resources or mating partners—had less reproductive fitness than adherents, leading 
to a co-evolution of both cognitive and cultural changes that were mutually aligned (Sterelny 
2011). While cultural norms that facilitated cooperation were selected for at the group level, 
psychological changes at the individual level took the form of social emotions, such as gratitude 
and guilt, that facilitated adherence to the new cultural mores (Gintis 2011; Frank 1988). 
 
From behavior-contingent reciprocity to intention-contingent reciprocity: the emergence of 
social intelligence  
 
Genetic adaptations (e.g. social emotions) to cooperative cultures were part of a broader 
“social intelligence” that allowed people to adjust their actions according to both the observable 
                                                                                                                                                       
greatly facilitates the ability to read intentions. The cooperative eye hypothesis suggests this characteristic developed 
in humans embedded in cultural environment where reading intentions was an important consideration for 
cooperation. This is in contrast to the 200+ nonhuman primates—all of whom have dark eyes with barely visible 
sclera—who lacked the cultures that made such adaptations necessary. 
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behaviors of others as well as “theory of mind”-based deductions of others’ intentionality (Fehr 
and Gacther 2002; Yamagishi, Kikuchi, and Kosugi 1999; Tomasello et al. 2005). Of particular 
importance in emergent cooperative societies is the ability to distinguish between egoistic and 
altruistic intentions (Vanneste et al. 2007). The presence of this duality would be reinforced by 
multilevel selection, with individual selection favoring those who maximized their own resources 
while group selection pressures rewarded cultures that maximized collective benefits (Wilson 
2012a; Wilson and Wilson 2007; Wilson 2012b). Given that a cooperative society—held in place 
by moral codes and the successful play against less cooperative groups—can be undermined by 
noncooperative actors (Axelrod 1980), the ability to detect not only noncooperative behavior, but 
also intentions such as egoism that might portend noncooperative behavior, would be 
evolutionarily advantageous.  
In the context of reciprocal exchanges between two people, egoistic givers of benefits 
would be those who are more likely to give with the expectation of reciprocity, an expectation 
justified by the prevalence of reciprocity norms in cooperative cultures. Yet after the benefits 
have been conferred, reciprocating will be costly for recipients, especially in exchanges between 
nonrelated individuals who do not expect to interact again. Selection pressures at the societal 
level however would provide the circumstances for individuals to overcome such short-term 
thinking by reinforcing characteristics that allow people to reciprocate, as chance encounters 
between strangers are the contexts for emergent cooperative relationships between nonkin. 
Recipients would thus reciprocate if they perceive benefactors as having altruistic (other-
focused) intentions, since this signals that the benefactors are contributing to a cooperative 
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enterprise; by contrast, recipients may be more hesitant if they believe benefactors are focused 
on self-gain.11  
In other words, reciprocating under such circumstances would be evolutionarily 
advantageous within cooperative societies if recipients feel they are indeed contributing to a 
group enterprise—i.e. if they feel that their exchange partners are taking a collective or relational 
view of the partnership rather than one of pure self-interest. Recent work on perceived mental 
states lends support to this argument. Ames et al. (2004), for instance, found that recipients of 
favors who perceived givers as having affective rather than cost-benefit mental states believed 
the benefactor had a more positive view of the “nature of their relationship.” Recipients may feel 
compelled to honor—by greater reciprocity—what they perceive as the benefactors positive view 
of the relation (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). 
Social emotions such as gratitude may play a role in encouraging reciprocity when 
altruistic intentions are perceived. Recent laboratory studies have demonstrated that gratitude is 
lower when recipients perceive givers as egoistically rather than altruistically motivated (Tsang 
2006a; Tsang 2006a; Watkins et al. 2006). As a motivator of prosocial behavior, gratitude may 
reinforce cooperative behavior by causing recipients who experience gratitude to reciprocate in 
kind (Tsang 2006a; Tsang 2006b; Bartlett and DeSteno 2006; McCullough, Kimeldorf, and 
Cohen 2008). Less directly, experiencing gratitude as a result of perceiving altruistic intentions 
may contribute to recipients’ sense of kinship or solidarity with their exchange partner, reifying 
the relationship itself and paving the way for longer-term cohesion should it have the chance to 
develop (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; Lawler 2001; Ames et al. 2004). Relational cohesion 
should be highest in exchanges where recipients experience more gratitude as a result of the 
                                                
11 Note that this discussion and the ensuing treatment of “perceived intentions” is from the point of view of the 
recipient, not the giver; moreover, emphasis is placed on perceptions of givers’ intentions rather than givers’ actual 
intentions. 
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initial transfer of benefits from the benefactor. As Lawler and colleagues have shown, relational 
cohesion in turn should manifest in commitment behaviors such as sacrificial contributions 
towards the relationship. 
Hypothesis 1a (“reciprocity effect”): Recipients who perceive givers as having altruistic 
intentions will reciprocate more than recipients who perceive benefactors as having 
egoistic intentions. 
Hypothesis 1b (“cohesion effect”): Recipients who perceive givers as having altruistic 
rather than egoistic intentions will be more likely to characterize their relationship with 
the givers as cohesive and solidary. 
Hypothesis 1c (“reciprocity mediation”): Recipients’ feeling of relational cohesion 
should mediate the relationship between perceived altruism and reciprocity.  
When givers give very large (as opposed to smaller) favors, recipients may find it more 
acceptable for the givers to weigh the personal costs and benefits in giving such favors, as not to 
do so would seem a form of martyrdom (Ames et al. 2004). By manipulating the size of favors 
using vignettes, Ames et al. indeed found that recipients expected givers of very large favors to 
more carefully consider the pros and cons of giving with respect to the givers’ own welfare. By 
contrast, the ostensible intentions underlying smaller benefits can seem more emblematic of the 
relationship (Goffman 1961), and as a result, perceived intentions for less exorbitant benefits 
may be more likely to affect a recipients’ willingness to reciprocate.  
Hypothesis 1d (“exorbitant benefits”): The effect of perceived intentions on reciprocity 
will be lower when the benefits are very costly to givers rather than less costly. 
If future interactions unexpectedly occur, recipients who have already reciprocated are no 
longer bound by reciprocity norms or the sense of obligation induced by receiving the initial 
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benefit. In this respect, the size of the givers’ initial benefit in the “focal” exchange should have 
no bearing on recipients’ future willingness to help their initial benefactors. This may be for two 
reasons. First, the size of the benefit merely makes reciprocity norms more salient, increasing 
recipients’ desire to reciprocate but not necessarily influencing their willingness to help after 
reciprocity has occurred. Second, recipients’ sense of relational cohesion is not expected to be 
higher for very large benefits versus more moderate ones. As argued above, what matters is 
recipients’ view that givers’ are other-focused (i.e. have altruistic rather than egoistic intentions). 
Moreover, Lawler and Yoon (1996) argue that relational cohesion should be highest when 
exchanges are “successful” from a collective standpoint (see also Lawler 2001). “Success” in this 
case may be measured by the total benefits that exist following reciprocation. Higher relational 
cohesion—resulting from perceiving benefactors as altruistically motivated and having 
successful exchanges—should in turn manifest as greater commitment towards the relationship 
even after recipients have “resolved” the focal exchange by reciprocating benefits (Lawler and 
Yoon 1996). This increased commitment should manifest behaviorally in recipients’ willingness 
to provide unconditional help to givers after the focal exchange has taken place. 
Hypothesis 2a (“generosity effect”): Recipients who perceive givers as having altruistic 
rather than egoistic intentions will be more generous towards givers should future 
interactions occur. 
Hypothesis 2b (“generosity mediation”): Recipients’ feeling of relational cohesion 
following the focal exchange should mediate the relationship between perceived altruism 
and recipients’ future generosity towards givers. 
Hypothesis 2c (“limitations of behavior”): The size of givers’ initial benefits should not 
influence recipients’ future generosity towards givers.  
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The giver’s initial provision of a benefit, the recipient’s reciprocity, and the recipient’s future 
generosity are illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
FIGURE 3.1 
Focal Exchange and Recipient’s Subsequent Generosity 
 
 
 
STUDY 
Setting 
To test the above hypotheses, I conducted an experiment on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT; www.mturk.com), a popular online crowdsourcing platform with over 100,000 registered 
users (Pontin 2007). AMT allows its users (“workers”) to complete tasks online in exchange for 
small amounts of money. These tasks are posted by “requesters” who are able to reimburse 
workers while maintaining workers’ anonymity. In recent years, AMT has been increasingly 
used by behavioral scientists for conducting experiments, given the large and easily accessible 
participant pool and the low cost for conducing research (Bohannon 2011; Lawson et al. 2010; 
Dodds et al. 2011; Suri and Watts 2011). Several recent studies have demonstrated the platform’s 
reliability and validity (Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011, Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 
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2011; Rand 2012). Traditional lab studies replicated on AMT have consistently found similar 
results (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis 2010; Horton et al. 2011; Suri and Watts 2011).  
In addition to the increased reliability stemming from automated procedures, conducting 
the present study on AMT offers two important advantages over a traditional laboratory 
experiment using undergraduates. First, studies of AMT worker demographics demonstrate that 
worker populations are more representative of the general public along several dimensions, 
including age, education, and ethnic diversity, when compared to the undergraduate populations 
commonly used for experiments (Rand 2012; Ross et al. 2010; Buhrmester et al. 2011; for a 
detailed discussion of AMT’s strengths and limitations, see Mason and Suri 2012). Second, 
because workers’ anonymity can be ensured, there is no potential for future interaction between 
participants, nor are there potential demand effects caused by the physical presence of 
researchers. 
 
Subjects 
264 participants (149 females, 115 males) completed the study, which took 30 minutes to 
complete on average. Similar to prior studies requiring English fluency (cf. Eriksson and 
Simpson 2011), 70% of the participants were located in the United States, 22% in India, and the 
remaining 8% divided across the United Kingdom, Canada, and other predominantly English 
speaking countries. The median age was 28 and educational background was mixed (9% high 
school degrees, 34% associate degrees or some college, 38% bachelor degrees, 17% graduate 
degrees). 
Participants were paid a flat base rate of $2.50, along with a cash bonus corresponding to 
the amount of points ($0.10 each) and gift coupons ($0.05 each) they possessed at the end of the 
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study. The average resulting reimbursement per participant ($3.55) was just slightly higher than 
payments for other AMT studies of similar length and involvement (see Mason and Suri 2010 for 
an explanation of AMT payment norms). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 The study consisted of three parts. Participants first completed an Introductory Task (Part 
1), followed by a single round of a two-step “give-some” game adapted from prior to research to 
mimic favor exchange (Part 2; c.f. De Bruin and Van Lange 1999). After the round completed, 
participants were presented with an opportunity to give gift coupons (redeemable for cash) to 
their exchange partners from Part 2; the purpose here was to test whether perceived intentions in 
a given “focal” exchange might influence the participant’s future generosity (Part 3; cf. Lawler 
and Yoon 1993, 1996).  
Part 1: Participants completed one of seven “Introductory Tasks,” which they were told 
had been randomly assigned to them. In reality all participants received the same task (entitled 
“Point Choice Decisions,” which consisted of selecting desirable point outcomes between 
oneself and an ostensible other).  
 Part 2:  Participants were then told they would be paired with another AMT worker to 
engage in a two-step “interaction”; in actuality, the other worker was simulated. Prior to the 
interaction, participants were told both they and their partners would each be given 4 points and 
be randomly assigned to the role of first-mover or second-mover. Furthermore, participants were 
instructed that second-movers would receive the results of the first-mover’s Introductory Task as 
a way of gaining a bit more information about their partners; first-movers would not have access 
to second-movers task. 
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During the first step, first-movers would have an opportunity to give some or none of 
their 4 points to their partners. Any points given would be doubled upon receipt. During the 
second step, second-movers would have an opportunity to give some or none of their resulting 
points (the initial 4 points, along with any points accumulated during the first step) to the first-
movers. Again, any points given would be doubled upon receipt.  
After these instructions were given, participants were presented with ten 5-item questions 
to assess their comprehension. If a participant answered any one of the ten questions incorrectly, 
the instructions were presented again, and the participant was given a second chance to respond 
to any question(s) they had incorrectly answered. 
Following the comprehension check, participants were told they had been randomly 
paired with the AMT worker and that they were now connected online; moreover, participants 
were told they had been “randomly” assigned a role as second-mover. As second movers, they 
were then presented with the “results” of the Introductory Task that had been assigned to their 
partner, with the assurance that their partner would not see the results of the participants’ 
Introductory Task. After a brief wait, participants were informed that the other had given them 
points, thus constituting the first move. A readout indicated how many points each partner had at 
the current juncture. The participants then decided how many (if any) points to give to their 
partner, after which they were told the exchange had ended and that they and their partner were 
no longer connected.  
Part 3: At this point, a screen appeared indicating they had been randomly selected to 
receive 8 gift coupons, each valued at $0.05 apiece. Participants decided how many of these 
coupons they would like to keep for themselves and how many they would like to be added to 
their partner’s cash bonus. To eliminate expectations of reciprocity, participants were told that 
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only they, and not their partner, had been given coupons and that there would be no future 
interactions or exchanges with their partner. Participants were further told that if they chose to 
give their partner coupons, their partner would not know how many coupons had initially been 
allotted to the participant. In addition, if no coupons were given to the partner, the partner would 
never know the participants had been given coupons.  
After participants had decided how many gift coupons to give to their partners, the study 
concluded with a follow-up survey, where participants reported their sense of relational cohesion 
with their partner, the emotions they experienced upon receiving the initial benefit from their 
partners, and any suspicions they had regarding their partners or the experimental design. 
Participants were then given a monetary bonus based on the number of points and gift coupons in 
their possession at the completion of the interaction. 
 
Manipulations 
Partner’s intention and benefit size served as binary experimental manipulations. These 
manipulations were crossed, yielding four conditions to which participants were randomly 
assigned.  
Perceived intention: Upon being connected with their partners during Part 2, participants 
were told that their partner’s Introductory Task from Part 1 had been the “Motivation & Intention 
Diagnostic (MID),” which was described as “a highly reliable and validated measure of 
unconscious intentional tendencies (Diskanhaus & Gilovetch 2007).” Participants were further 
told that “the abridged version of MID used in this study specifically measures the following two 
motivational tendencies: concern for self (egoism) and concern for others (altruism).” In the 
Egoistic condition, participants were told that their partner had scored high on egoism (8.7 out of 
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10) and slightly below average (4.1) on altruism. These scores were reversed for the Altruistic 
condition (in a pilot study, participants reported not believing extremely low scores on either the 
egoism or altruism dimensions; hence “high” vs. “slightly below average” comparisons were 
used to create the manipulation). Upon receiving their partner’s scores, participants then 
answered a series of manipulation check questions. 
Benefit size: Participants received either 3 points or 4 points from their partners during 
the first step of the give-some game in Part 2. In the pilot study (26 participants), additional 
conditions of 1 and 2 points were included. Because of the doubling of points and the readily 
apparent advantages to mutual cooperation, those receiving 1 point in the pilot registered 
significant disappointment upon receiving such a “favor.” While those receiving 2 points were 
not disappointed per se, they did not characterize such a gift positively as a “favor” (unlike those 
who received 3 or 4 points). Since the scope of this study concerns benefits that are favorably 
perceived, 1 and 2 point conditions were not included.  
 
Measures 
Gratitude: I measured gratitude using Tsang’s (2006a) three-item scale, which asks 
participants to report their emotions upon recalling a recent situation. Participants were asked to 
indicate how they felt after seeing the results of their partner’s decision in Step One. Participants 
rated their felt experience of nine emotion adjectives using a 7-point Likert scale, anchored at 1 = 
“Not at all” and 7 = “Very much.” The scale for gratitude was constructed from three of these 
emotions: “thankful,” “appreciative,” and “grateful” (α = 0.89).  
Relational cohesion: I measured relational cohesion using Lawler, Thye and Yoon’s 
(2000) relational cohesion index. Participants were asked to rate their relationship with their 
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partners on four bi-polar spectrums: distant/close, coming apart/together, fragile/solid, and 
divisive/cohesive. These responses were averaged together to form the index (α = 0.93). 
Joint outcome: As a measure of the exchange’s collective “success,” joint outcome was 
the cumulative point total resulting from the focal exchange at the end of Part 2 (calculated by 
doubling the benefit each partner gave to the other, adding the 8 points initially allotted across 
both partners, and subtracting the face value of the benefits each gave to the other).  
Reciprocity: Reciprocity was measured by the number of points participants gave to their 
partners in the second step of the give-some game (Part 2).  
Future generosity: The gift-giving opportunity following the focal exchange indicated 
participants’ commitment to the relationship (Lawler et al. 2000). As in Lawler et al. (2000), 
these gifts were given unilaterally and “without strings or contingencies.” Yet unlike the study 
by Lawler and colleagues, these gifts had more value than merely token gifts, as their purpose 
here was to demonstrate tangible generosity above and beyond a mere expression of commitment 
to the relationship (Collett and Morrissey 2007).  
 
RESULTS 
Comprehension and Suspicion Checks 
21 participants were removed from the analysis because they responded incorrectly to 
more than one of the ten comprehension questions on their second attempt. When prompted 
whether they found any part of the study “hard to believe,” 11 participants clearly suspected they 
were not connected to another partner; their results were thus removed from the analysis. 26 
other participants (10%) questioned whether they were really connected with a partner. Because 
many of these participants indicated they assumed the connection was real until encountering the 
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suspicion check question, their results were kept in the analysis (excluding them in a separate 
analysis did not significantly alter the results discussed below).12 This left a usable sample of 232 
participants (135 females, 97 males). I found no effect of gender on reciprocity or future 
generosity; the results below reflect the combined participant pool of males and females.  
 
Manipulation Checks 
Responses from the manipulation check questions confirmed that participants were 
convinced their partners were more egoistic in the Egoistic condition and more altruistic in the 
Altruistic condition. The first two manipulation check questions asked for the participants to rate 
their partners on a 7-point Likert scale for egoism and altruism respectively. As expected, the 
results indicate that participants in the Egoistic condition viewed their partners as high on egoism 
and relatively low on altruism, while participants in the Altruistic condition viewed their partners 
as high on altruism and low on egoism  (for the egoism measure: Egoistic condition mean = 5.88 
vs. Altruistic condition mean = 3.27, t-value = 29.28, p<.001; for the altruism measure: Egoistic 
condition mean = 3.10 vs. Altruistic condition mean = 5.98, t-value -33.36, p<.001). Five 
subsequent questions, drawn from the Self Report Altruism Scale (Rushton, Chrisjohn and 
Fekken 1981), asked participants to rate how likely their partners would engage in a variety of 
different altruistic behaviors (e.g. “give money to charity,” “help push a stranger’s car out of the 
snow”) using a 7-point Likert scale. Results from these five questions were averaged and 
compared across conditions; the results further indicate the manipulations functioned as expected 
(Egoistic condition mean = 3.62 vs. Altruistic condition mean = 5.99, t-value = -21.47, p<.001).  
                                                
12 By contrast, many participants mentioned they found the study and their interactions with their partners to be 
deeply engaging, even though their interaction with their partners was limited solely to a single round of point 
exchange. The following comment from a participant was not atypical: “I felt this was a very different study and 
frankly, was surprised how much it was almost an emotional reaction to how my partner treated me and I treated 
them...which made this whole experience rather personal and also very weird!” 
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I further verified that the intentions participants attributed to their partners in the focal 
exchange were consonant with participants’ perceptions of their partners’ dispositional 
characteristics as induced by the manipulation. At the conclusion of the experiment, I asked 
participants to rate their partners’ motivation for giving the amount of points they gave in Step 
One on a scale of 1 (“My partner was very concerned about himself/herself”) to 7 (“My partner 
was very concerned about me”). Overall, participants in the Egoistic condition were more likely 
to rate their partners as giving out of self-interest rather than altruism (Egoistic condition mean = 
3.74 vs. Altruistic condition mean = 4.93, t-value = -6.82, p<.001). Finally, I assessed whether 
participants who perceived their partners as egoistic were more likely to believe their partners 
expected a payback as a result of providing their initial benefit. Using a 7-point Likert scale, 
participants rated their agreement with the following statement: “For Step Two, I believe my 
partner expected I would give at least the same amount of points that he/she gave me in Step One 
(not including the doubling effects).” The results indicate that participants in the Egoistic 
condition were more likely to believe their partners expected an equivalent or greater payback 
than participants in the Altruistic condition (Egoistic condition mean = 5.94 vs. Altruistic 
condition mean = 5.49, t-value = 2.60, p<.01). 
 
Reciprocity 
Table 3.1 reports the mean values, standard deviations, and correlations for the study’s 
main variables. Table 3.2 reports mean values for these variables across conditions. Because the 
distributions of reciprocated points (“Reciprocity”) across conditions were not normal (Shapiro 
Wilk’s W = 0.86 and W = 0.85 for the Egoistic and Altruistic conditions, respectively; p<.001), I 
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used the Mann-Whitney U-test statistic rather than the t-test for the following reciprocity 
comparisons.  
The “reciprocity effect” hypothesis (Hypothesis 1a) predicted that recipients will 
reciprocate more when benefactors are perceived to have altruistic rather than egoistic intentions. 
This hypothesis was supported by the data. Participants in the Egoistic condition gave an average 
of 2.90 (SD = 1.98) points to their partner, whereas participants in the Altruistic condition gave 
an average of 3.40 points (SD = 1.62; U = 7736.5, z = -2.08, p<.05). I also examined the number 
of points reciprocated across the Egoistic versus Altruistic condition by controlling for benefit 
size using a linear regression model. The results are presented in Table 3.3. Consonant with the 
pairwise comparison noted above, Model 1 shows partner’s intention as a significant single 
predictor of reciprocity (β =.51, p ≤.05); Model 2 demonstrates that both the strength and 
significance of the coefficient is maintained after controlling for benefit size, which itself is also 
significant (partner’s intention: β =.53, p ≤.05; benefit size: β =.84, p ≤.001). These results add 
further support to the reciprocity effect hypothesis.  
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TABLE 3.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations  
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 6. 
1. Perceived altruism  -- -- 0 1       
2. Benefit size  -- -- 3 4 -0.03      
3. Gratitude  5.94 1.17 1 7 0.11 0.10     
4. Relational cohesion 4.70 1.50 1 7 0.26* 0.06 0.33*    
5. Joint outcome 14.66 1.99 11 24 0.12 0.46* 0.19* 0.37*   
6. Reciprocity 3.15 1.82 0 12 0.14* 0.23* 0.18* 0.39* 0.97*  
7. Future generosity 2.66 1.92 0 8 0.10 -0.03 0.19* 0.19* 0.37* 0.42* 
* p<0.05 
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TABLE 3.2 
Means and Standard Deviations across Perceived Intention and Benefit Size 
 
 Egoistic (n = 115)  
Altruistic 
(n = 117)  
Benefit size = 3 
(n = 114)  
Benefit size = 4 
(n = 118) 
  B = 3 B = 4 Comb.  B = 3 B = 4 Comb.  Ego Alt Comb.  Ego Alt Comb. 
Gratitude  5.59 
(1.25) 
6.02 
(1.32) 
5.81 
(1.30) 
 6.03 
(0.98) 
6.11 
(1.05) 
6.07 
(1.01) 
 5.59 
(1.25) 
6.03 
(0.98) 
5.82 
(1.13) 
 6.02 
(1.32) 
6.11 
(1.05) 
6.06 
(1.20) 
Relational cohesion  4.16  
(1.73) 
4.45 
(1.63) 
4.31 
(1.68) 
 5.03 
(1.00) 
5.15 
(1.37) 
5.09 
(1.20) 
 4.16 
(1.73) 
5.03 
(1.00) 
4.61 
(1.46) 
 4.45 
(1.63) 
5.15 
(1.37) 
4.79 
(1.54) 
Joint outcome  13.31 
(1.51) 
15.43 
(2.20) 
14.42 
(2.17) 
 14.12 
(1.26) 
15.69 
(1.88) 
14.90 
(1.78) 
 13.31 
(1.51) 
14.12 
(1.26) 
13.73 
(1.44) 
 15.43 
(2.20) 
15.69 
(1.88) 
15.56 
(2.04) 
Reciprocity  2.31 
(1.51) 
3.43 
(2.20) 
2.90 
(1.98) 
 3.12 
(1.26) 
3.69 
(1.88) 
3.40 
(1.62) 
 2.31  
(1.51) 
3.12 
(1.26) 
2.73 
(1.44) 
 3.43 
(2.20) 
3.69 
(1.88) 
3.56 
(2.04) 
Future generosity  2.22 
(1.77) 
2.72 
(2.04) 
2.48 
(1.93) 
 3.20 
(1.84) 
2.48 
(1.94) 
2.85 
(1.91) 
 2.22 
(1.77) 
3.20 
(1.84) 
2.73 
(1.86) 
 2.72 
(2.04) 
2.48 
(1.94) 
2.60 
(1.99) 
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TABLE 3.3 
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting the Effects of Perceived Intentions on Reciprocity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
(B = 3) 
Model 6 
(B = 4) 
Constant 2.90*** -0.08 -1.64* -1.68* 2.31*** 3.43*** 
Perceived intention†  0.51* 0.53*  0.18 0.81** 0.26 
Benefit size (B)  0.84*** 0.75*** 0.76***   
Relational cohesion   0.46*** 0.44***   
R
2
 0.02 0.07 0.20 0.20 0.08 0.00 
Adjusted R
2
 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.07 -0.00 
F 4.56 9.10 27.99 18.85 9.68 0.46 
df 1, 230 2, 229 2, 229 3, 228 1, 112 1, 116 
† 0 = egoistic, 1 = altruistic       
+ p<0.10       
 * p<0.05       
 ** p<0.01       
 *** p<0.001       
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The “exorbitant benefit” hypothesis (Hypothesis 1d) predicted that the effect of perceived 
altruism on reciprocity would be lower when recipients receive benefits that are very costly to 
givers rather than less costly. Figure 3.2 illustrates the mean points given across the perceived 
intention and benefit size conditions. As predicted, partner’s intention was highly significant in 
the 3 point condition but not in the 4 point condition (Table 3.3, Model 5, β =.81, p ≤.01; Model 
6, β =.26, n.s.). Of particular note is that partner’s intention had a similar effect on reciprocity in 
the 3 point condition (Model 5, β =.81, p ≤.01) as the effect of benefit size across the 3 and 4 
point conditions (Model 2, β =.84, p ≤.001).  
 
FIGURE 3.2 
Reciprocity by Perceived Intention and Benefit size 
 
 
Relational Cohesion 
The “cohesion effect” hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b) predicted that recipients who perceive 
givers as having altruistic intentions will be more likely to characterize their relationship with 
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their partners as cohesive and solidary. The results strongly support this prediction. Participants 
in the Altruistic condition characterized their relationship with their partners as more cohesive 
than participants in the Egoistic condition (Egoistic condition mean = 4.31 vs. Altruistic 
condition mean = 5.09, t-value –4.07, p<.001). Table 3.4 shows that the effect of perceived 
altruism on relational cohesion remained significant after controlling for benefit size using 
multiple regression (Model 1, β = 0.78, p ≤.001); the size of the benefit participants received had 
no effect on cohesion (Model 2, β = 0.20, n.s.).  
 
TABLE 3.4 
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting the Effects of Perceived Intentions on Relational 
Cohesion 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 4.31*** 3.60*** 1.19 
Perceived intention† 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.62*** 
Benefit size (B)  0.20 -0.36+ 
Joint outcome   0.30*** 
R
2
 0.07 0.07 0.20 
Adjusted R
2
 0.06 0.06 0.19 
F 16.58 8.85 18.66 
df 1, 230 2, 229 3, 228 
† 0 = egoistic, 1 = altruistic    
+ p<0.10    
 * p<0.05    
 ** p<0.01    
 *** p<0.001    
 
An alternative explanation for the effect of perceived altruism on relational cohesion is 
that recipients who had more “successful” exchanges (i.e. where the collective outcome was the 
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highest)—perhaps as a result of perceiving altruistic intentions—would be more apt to 
characterize their relationships with the givers as cohesive. To rule this out, I controlled for joint 
outcome in Model 3. While the effect of joint outcome was significant (as predicted by Lawler  
[2001]; β = 0.30, p<.001), it did not reduce the significance or substantially alter the effect size 
of perceived intention (β = 0.62, p<.001).13 
The “reciprocity mediation” hypothesis (Hypothesis 1c) predicted that recipients’ feeling 
of relational cohesion would mediate the relationship between perceived altruism and 
reciprocity. The Sobel test for mediation provides strong evidence for this mechanism (z = 3.38, 
p<.001). Relational cohesion positively predicts reciprocity after controlling for benefit size 
(Table 3.3, Model 3, β = 0.46, p<.001); moreover, when perceived intention is added back to the 
model, its coefficient is reduced to non-significance while relational cohesion remains significant 
(Table 3.3, Model 4; perceived intention: β = 0.18, n.s.; relational cohesion: β = 0.44, p<.001). 
 
Future Generosity 
Table 3.5 presents results for the effect of perceived intentions on future generosity. The 
“generosity effect” hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a) predicted that recipients’ perceptions of givers’ 
intentions in the focal exchange should influence recipients’ future generosity towards givers 
should future interactions occur. This prediction received partial support.  While the main effect 
for perceived intention on future generosity was not significant (Model 1, β =.36, n.s.), perceived 
intention in the original exchange appeared to have a sizable effect on future generosity in the 3 
point condition (Model 4, β =.99, p ≤.01). No effect of partner’s intention was found in the 4 
point condition (Model 5, β = -.23, n.s.).  
The “generosity mediation” hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) predicted that recipients’ feeling 
                                                
13 Note also that perceived altruism also did not correlate with joint outcome (Table 3.1, r = 0.12, n.s.). 
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of relational cohesion would mediate the relationship between perceived altruism and recipients’ 
future generosity towards givers. While no main effect exists for perceived intention on 
generosity, the Sobel test for mediation indicates a mediating effect of relational cohesion (z = 
2.20, p<.05). Moreover, relational cohesion positively predicts generosity after controlling for 
benefit size (Model 2, β = 0.24, p<.01) and remains significant when perceived intention is added 
back to the model (Model 3, β = 0.22, p<.01). The “limitations of behavior” hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 2c) predicted that the size of givers’ initial benefit should not influence recipients’ 
future generosity towards givers. As expected, benefit size had no effect on future generosity 
(Model 1, β = -.12, n.s.). 
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TABLE 3.5 
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting the Effects of Perceived Intentions on Future Generosity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  
(B = 3) 
Model 5  
(B = 4) 
Constant 2.89** 2.13* 2.08* 2.22*** 2.72*** 
Perceived intention† 0.36  0.19 0.99** -0.23 
Benefit size (B) -0.12 -0.17 -0.16   
Relational cohesion  0.24** .22**   
R
2
 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.00 
Adjusted R
2
 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.01 
F 1.17 4.32 3.05 8.48 0.41 
df 2, 229 2, 229 3, 228 1, 112 1, 116 
† 0 = egoistic, 1 = altruistic      
+ p<0.10       
 * p<0.05      
 ** p<0.01      
 *** p<0.001      
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DISCUSSION 
I found that recipients who perceived benefactors as having altruistic intentions 
reciprocated more than recipients who perceived benefactors as having egoistic intentions, but 
only when benefactors gave moderate rather than large benefits. Recipients who perceived givers 
as having altruistic intentions were more likely to characterize their partner relationships as 
cohesive, and recipients in cohesive relationships reciprocated more than recipients in less 
cohesive relationships. These correlations contributed to the full mediation effect of relational 
cohesion on the relationship between perceived motives and reciprocity. Consistent with the 
theory of relational cohesion, joint outcome was positively associated with relational cohesion, 
yet this effect was separate from the influence of perceived motives on relational cohesion 
(Lawler and Yoon 1996; Lawler 2001). 
The influence of perceived intentions on generosity was similar to that for reciprocity: 
perceived intentions influenced generosity only when givers had given moderate but not very 
large benefits. Relational cohesion appeared to explain this effect, whereby greater cohesion 
resulting from perceived intentions was more likely to result in commitment behaviors toward 
exchange partners, manifesting first as reciprocity in the focal exchange and later as generosity 
in the gift-giving opportunity. Importantly, relational cohesion did not correlate with the size of 
givers’ initial benefit, only with the final outcome of the exchange. Thus, when givers gave 
larger benefits, there was no increase in relational cohesion to inspire recipients to make 
sacrificial contributions towards their partner (again, by reciprocity in the focal exchange or 
generosity in the gift-giving opportunity).  
The influence of perceived altruism on reciprocity and future generosity demonstrated in 
this study is consistent with prior research on emotions and decision modes. Heider (1958), for 
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instance, argued that when expectations of reciprocity are made explicit, recipients should feel 
less gratitude than when such expectations are not present. In their vignette studies of perceived 
mental states, Ames et al. (2004) found gratitude to be predictive of recipients’ “interaction 
attitudes,” a relational construct whose measure asks recipients to rate their agreement with the 
following statements of desire to interact with their benefactors: “If I needed help in the future, I 
would ask X” and “I’d look forward to future interactions with X.” In the same study, the 
researchers manipulated recipients’ inferences of their benefactors’ mental states — i.e. the 
perception that the benefactor helped the recipient out of “intrinsic concern and affection” or 
only after weighing the costs and benefits of providing such help. While gratitude was highly 
correlated with mental states, both constructs were separately predictive of interaction attitudes. 
The mediating effect of relational cohesion, as demonstrated in the present study, is consistent 
with Ames et al.’s argument that perceived mental states (affective vs. cost-benefit calculus) 
influences recipients’ belief that givers have a positive view of the relationship, and recipients 
will be more inclined to interact with others who like them than those who do not. 
 Molm (2010) recently commented that reciprocity has been taken for granted in social 
exchange research. While recent theorizing may be relatively lacking, earlier theorizing largely 
attended to the value of the original benefit by focusing on power and dependence. The present 
study aims to address this gap. Data from this study strongly supports the general argument that 
perceived intentions influence reciprocity inasmuch as “actions” for recipients of non-exorbitant 
benefits. Whereas the norm of reciprocity focuses on feelings of obligation, perceiving altruistic 
intentions can transcend such norms to inspire not only greater reciprocity in the focal exchange, 
but future generosity towards the original benefactor as well. Participants in this study rewarded 
altruistic partners in the subsequent gift-giving opportunity, even after controlling for the 
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magnitude of the benefit originally provided by the partner. By contrast, the magnitude of the 
benefit originally provided by the partner had no effect on the recipient’s subsequent generosity 
towards the benefactor. These results suggest that perceived intentions have lasting effects that 
manifest in future interactions. 
Ironically, the norm of reciprocity—when made salient by perceiving the payback drive 
of the giver—actually impedes reciprocity. The norm of reciprocity, as a taken-for-granted 
societal dictum, does not accurately capture our tendency to reward when free of the obligation 
to reciprocate. In fact, when we feel obligated by benefactors to reciprocate – even when such 
obligations are not explicitly stated – we may be less inclined to do so. Moreover, in its implicit 
focus on a single mutual exchange, the norm of reciprocity as an explanation for reciprocity fails 
to capture the nuanced dynamics of the emergent relationship, where willingness to help one’s 
partner can transcend the focal exchange. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This study focuses on one-shot exchanges between strangers to provide a robust and 
extreme test of the power of perceived intentions in affecting reciprocity. While historically less 
commonplace, this type of interaction is increasingly frequent given the wide reach and 
anonymity of communication made possible by the Internet. Nevertheless, one limitation of 
adopting the present scope conditions is that many relationships initiated with strangers in the 
offline world have the potential to continue into the future. Further research may seek to examine 
how reciprocal behavior is correspondingly perceived as egoistic or altruistic, potentially 
inspiring feedback loops of egoism or altruism that cascade into relational disintegration or 
cohesion respectively. 
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In addition to restricting the shadow of the future, the present study solely examines the 
effect of perceived motives in direct reciprocal exchange. I chose this focus due to the increased 
uncertainty and risk in such exchanges—relative to negotiated exchange where both parties 
provide benefits to the other simultaneously—and thus the importance of perceived intentions 
should be paramount (Molm 1994; Molm et al. 1999). Yet as Lawler (2001) has argued, 
productive exchange is more likely to result in stronger emotional responses among exchange 
participants. As a result, it’s possible that the consequences of perceived intentions on 
contributions towards the joint task may be of greater importance than in reciprocal exchange. 
Future research could examine such comparisons. 
In the present study, recipients were given the opportunity to provide gifts to their 
exchange partners immediately after the focal exchange had been completed. To the degree that 
gratitude and other positive emotions associated with the altruistic benefactors was responsible 
for gift-giving, generous behavior beyond the focal exchange may be rather time-dependent. It 
should be noted that while gratitude was indeed correlated with future generosity, it did not 
mediate the relationship between perceived altruism and future generosity. Nevertheless, future 
research could examine how the dissipation of gratitude influences future generosity. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PROSOCIAL VALUES, RECIPROCITY, AND THE MEDIATING  
ROLE OF PERCEIVED MOTIVES IN FAVOR EXCHANGE 
  
Favor exchanges are social dilemmas. To maximize gains, self-interested recipients of 
favors should not return favors; and givers of favors who stop to think about this should refrain 
from initially giving favors, leaving both potential givers and recipients worse off. Yet favor 
exchanges occur frequently, and increasingly so in organizations as hierarchical forms of 
leadership give way to “flatter” models that emphasize worker involvement (Howard 1995; 
Morhman, Cohen, and Mohrman 1995; Flynn 2003). This trend, coupled with the growing body 
of evidence linking reciprocity with productivity at both the individual and organizational levels, 
has inspired renewed scholarly interest in the causes and consequences of favor exchange (Barr 
and Serneels 2009; Zhang and Epley 2009; Flynn et al. 2006; Buchan, Croson, and Dawes 2002).  
Most explanations of why people reciprocate favors refer to the norm of reciprocity, which 
states that “(1) people should help those who have helped them, and (2) people should not injure 
those who have helped them” (Gouldner 1960:171). In outlining the popular theory of reciprocal 
altruism, Trivers (1971) further argued that adherence to this norm incurs evolutionary 
advantages, suggesting that humans are biologically “hard-wired” to reciprocate. Recent research 
on social value preferences has built on this earlier work, demonstrating that person and situation 
factors moderate people’s willingness to reciprocate in dyadic social exchange (Van Lange and 
Kuhlman 1994; Balliet, Parks, and Joireman 2009). At the personal level, people differ in their 
social value orientation – i.e. their preferences for outcomes that benefit themselves versus others 
– due to a combination of social learning and genetics (Van Lange et al. 1997). At the situation 
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level, groups may correspondingly differ in their emphasis of individualistic versus collectivistic 
values (Triandis 1995). At both of these levels, prosocial values are expected to promote 
reciprocity in favor exchange because reciprocating benefits the dyad. Put differently, the norm 
of reciprocity appears to be more strongly upheld by individuals and groups holding prosocial 
value preferences (Perugini et al. 2003; Lester, Meglino and Korsgaard 2008). 
Yet people’s propensity to return favors may also be influenced by their perceptions of favor 
givers (Buchan, Croson and Dawes 2002; Ames, Flynn and Weber 2004; see also Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation). In their study comparing outcomes of direct and indirect social exchange, 
Buchan, Croson and Dawes (2002) conclude that reciprocity “seems to be motivated less by 
reciprocal norms (which suggest that proportions returned would not be influenced by the target 
of reciprocation), but instead by a motivation to reward or punish a partner” (emphasis added). 
A substantial body of game theoretic research on cooperation indeed has demonstrated that 
people in general are more inclined to reciprocate when others appear to be altruistically 
motivated (Rubin and Brown 1975; De Bruin and Van Lange 1999; see also Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation). 
If reciprocity is indeed more about rewarding favor givers and less about reciprocity norms, 
this raises questions about the nature of the link between prosocial values and reciprocity. Rather 
than increasing allegiance to reciprocity norms, prosocial values may promote reciprocity by 
affecting how exchange partners are perceived. Studies on the false consensus effect as well as 
research in organizational culture have demonstrated that people believe that their individual and 
group-level values are shared by others (Ross, Greene and House 1977; O’Reilly and Chatman 
1996; Van Assen et al. 2006). This suggests the following deductive syllogism, predicting that 
the relationship between prosocial values and reciprocity can be explained, at least in part, by 
 92 
perceived motives: (a) People with prosocial values at either the individual or group level are 
more apt to perceive others as altruistically motivated; (b) People in general are more willing to 
reciprocate with others who appear to be altruistically motivated; thus (c) People holding 
prosocial values should be more apt to reciprocate.  
In this study, I develop and test a model of this syllogism. I further assess the stronger 
argument that (c) holds solely because of (a) and (b). That is, I test whether the link between 
receivers’ prosocial values (at both the individual and group levels) and reciprocity is fully 
mediated by perceived motives. Using cross-national survey data of workers in a large 
multinational firm, I find empirical support for this mediating effect. These results suggest that 
prosocial values promote reciprocity not by increasing adherence to reciprocity norms, but by 
shaping how favor givers are perceived. Rather than an indication of general selflessness, 
prosocial values may be more aptly described as a lens by which others are viewed as having 
altruistic intentions, a view which in turn promotes selfless behavior.  
This research offers important contributions to existing theories of reciprocity and prosocial 
values. Many recent studies of reciprocity in the social sciences have a material orientation, 
focusing on equity imbalances, implying that “actions matter, not intentions” (Ames et al. 2004). 
This study suggests that intentions, or motives, matter as well, not just because people respond 
differently to different intentions, but because relatively stable dispositions toward particular 
intentions – as reflected in prosocial value preferences – affect how others are viewed; and these 
views in turn impact reciprocity and productivity. This suggests a self-reinforcing property of 
prosocial motivations: prosocial receivers of favors are more likely to perceive favor givers as 
altruistically motivated, and are thus more likely to reciprocate. Increased reciprocity manifests 
as greater trust and collegiality, which in turn encourage initiation and reciprocation of 
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subsequent favors (Kollock 1994; Flynn 2003). Conversely, proselfs are less willing to 
reciprocate, as they are less likely to perceive favor givers as altruistically motivated. 
Consequently, future opportunities to reciprocate are tempered by lower trust and solidarity. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Prosocial Value Preferences and Reciprocity 
Favor exchange refers to the giving and receiving of resources between two parties (Blau 
1964; Flynn 2003). These resources consist of “concrete” goods or services such as information, 
advice, or assistance, as opposed to “symbolic” resources such as love or status (Flynn 2003; Foa 
and Foa 1980). While the value of the resources being exchanged is typically indeterminate, 
most exchange theorists assume that the value of the help offered for the receiver is greater than 
the cost incurred as perceived by the helper (Blau 1964; Homans 1958). The frequent occurrence 
of reciprocity in favor exchange is often explained with reference to the norm of reciprocity, 
which holds that the receiver feels an obligation to restore equity in the relationship upon 
receiving the initial favor (Gouldner 1960; Blau 1964; Cialdini 1988). In general, the greater the 
imbalance of equity after a favor has been exchanged, the more obligated an individual will feel 
to reciprocate (Flynn 2003; Clark 1984). 
In addition to equity concerns, a significant body of research from the last three decades 
suggests that people’s willingness to reciprocate favors is also contingent on individual- and 
group-level prosocial value preferences (McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Van Lange et al. 1997; 
Triandis 1995; Chatman and Barsade 1995). While this research has primarily focused on 
cooperation rather than reciprocity, reciprocity and cooperation are intricately linked. In rational 
choice terms, cooperation refers to “an individual behavior that incurs personal costs in order to 
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engage in a joint activity that confers benefits exceeding these costs to other members of one’s 
group” (Bowles and Gintis 2003). Cooperation is often illustrated via the example of the 
prisoner’s dilemma (hereafter PD), in which two parties are given the choice to cooperate or 
defect. While each has an incentive to defect, the greatest collective gain occurs when both 
cooperate. Favor exchange reflects a sequential version of this game. If we assume that the help 
offered has more value to the receiver than the cost incurred by the helper, then the payoff 
structure is analogous to the PD. In social exchange terms, direct reciprocity occurs when a 
second mover cooperates rather than defects (Kollock 1993; Buchan, Croson and Dawes 2002).  
Individual-level prosocial values. Both individual-level and group-level prosocial value 
preferences have been predicted to increase reciprocity in dyadic exchange. At the individual-
level, social values reflect relatively stable preferences for outcomes that benefit the self versus 
others (McClintock and Allison 1989). While Messick and McClintock (1968) originally 
outlined six social value orientations, subsequent researchers often aggregate these into prosocial 
and proself orientations. People with prosocial orientations (“prosocials”) prefer outcomes that 
maximize benefits between self and others and minimize corresponding inequalities (Brucks and 
Van Lange 2007; Simpson 2004). Those with proself orientations (“proselfs”) prefer outcomes 
that maximize benefit for the self regardless of the outcome for others (De Cremer and Van 
Lange 2001; Liebrand et al. 1986). 
In game theoretic studies of cooperation, prosocials and proselfs exhibit rather different 
behavior. Building on prior studies of subjective interpretation of social dilemmas (Kelley and 
Thibaut 1978; Kiyonari, Tanida and Yamagishi 2000), Simpson (2004) demonstrated that 
prosocials tend to transform the matrix of payoffs in PD such that the payoffs resemble an 
assurance dilemma (AD). In PD, the reward for defecting if the other cooperates is greater than if 
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both cooperate. By contrast, in AD, the reward for defecting if the other cooperates is lower than 
if both cooperate. Importantly, prosocials transformed the matrix in both simultaneous and 
sequential versions of PD. In this respect, prosocials can be expected to not only initiate 
cooperation more than proselfs, but also to reciprocate by cooperating more than proselfs. 
Group-level prosocial values (collectivism). Similar to those adhering to prosocial values at 
the individual level, members of groups emphasizing prosocial values are also expected to 
reciprocate more than members of groups emphasizing more individualistic values (Chen, Chen 
and Meindl 1998). At the group level, prosocial value preferences are commonly conceptualized 
using the individualism-collectivism typology (Hofstede 2002; Triandis 1995). Collectivism, 
much like individual-level prosocial value preferences, implies a preference for outcomes 
benefiting the group (Triandis 1995).  
According to Triandis, groups emphasizing collectivistic values prioritize group goals over 
individual goals, whereas groups emphasizing individualistic values prioritize individual goals 
over group goals (Triandis 1995:43). Though widely used, this definition conflates task 
interdependence with community-oriented value preferences as factors responsible for group 
prioritization (Wagner 1995). Both task interdependence and community-oriented or prosocial 
value preferences are expected to promote reciprocity, but for different reasons. Task 
interdependence refers to “a relationship in which the goals of each individual or subunit can be 
achieved only if those of the others also can be achieved” (Chen, Chen and Meindl 1998; see 
also Deutsch 1949). In effect, groups characterized by task interdependence encourage 
reciprocity by material incentives. With respect to exchanging information, advice, and 
assistance, workers charged with interdependent tasks who fail to exchange these kinds of favors 
will find it difficult to be successful in their jobs. On the other hand, members of groups 
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emphasizing collectivistic values that promote prosociality would be expected to be more willing 
to reciprocate for different reasons. In such groups, members may reciprocate not because 
reciprocity is inherently required for their jobs, but because reciprocity reflects a widely shared 
preference for maximizing collective rather than individual outcomes (Chen, Chen and Meindl 
1998; Chatman and Spataro 2005).14  
 
The Role of Perceived Motives 
While the prosocial values of receivers or the receivers’ group may promote reciprocity, 
favor givers who are perceived as prosocial may also be more likely to inspire reciprocation. 
Social exchange theorists have often observed that receivers of favors cooperate or reciprocate 
based on particular views they hold regarding their exchange partners (cf. Buchan, Croson and 
Dawes 2002; see also Chapter 3 of this dissertation). In an early meta-analysis of 30 studies 
investigating the effects of others’ strategies on one’s own in iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, 
Rubin and Brown (1975) noted that the vast majority demonstrated that participants’ own 
cooperativeness significantly increased when others were deemed cooperative (see also 
McClintock and Liebrand 1988). In a simultaneous cooperation game, De Bruin and Van Lange 
(1999) similarly found that people gave five times more to others with other-regarding 
reputations than those who were thought to have self-interested motives.15 Hoffberg (Chapter 3 
of this dissertation) found that recipients who perceived givers as altruistically motivated were 
more likely to characterize their relationship with givers as cohesive, such that cohesion fully 
mediated the effect between perceived altruism and recipients’ reciprocity in one-shot exchanges 
                                                
14 While this discussion treats tasks interdependence and collectivistic (prosocial) values as conceptually distinct, 
these attributes are likely highly correlated.  
15 The authors coded reputation as moral/immoral; their definition of morality, however, primarily concerned self- 
versus other-regarding preferences. 
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(these effects were observed for moderate favors; perceived motives had no effect on reciprocity 
when very large favors were received from givers). Moreover, relational cohesion from an initial 
exchange influenced recipients’ generosity towards their original partners in a subsequent 
unexpected interaction. 
 
Revisiting the Relationship Between Prosocial Values and Reciprocity 
Individual-level prosocial values. Prosocials’ transformation of the PD payoff matrix has 
been hypothesized to occur because prosocials by definition prefer outcomes that benefit others 
(Simpson 2004; Van Lange 1997). In particular, Van Lange et al. (1997) suggest prosocials are 
predisposed to prioritize others due to a combination of social learning and genetics (see also 
Bogaert et al. 2008). This prioritization is often framed in terms of an aversion to equity 
imbalance (Van Lange 1999; Liebrand et al. 1986; Simpson 2004). For instance, the widely 
adopted measure used to assess participants’ prosociality in experimental studies asks 
participants to rank a series of inequalities between self and other by preference (Van Lange et 
al. 1997). Those who maximize joint gain and equality of outcomes are considered prosocial. 
This framing suggests that prosocials are more inclined than proselfs to feel a sense of obligation 
to return a favor after one has been given so as to restore equity in the relationship. In other 
words, prosocials may be more apt than proselfs to adhere to the norm of reciprocity (Perugini et 
al. 2003; Lester, Meglino and Korsgaard 2008). If prosocials are more willing to reciprocate than 
proselfs because they are more sensitive to equity imbalances, then we would expect prosocials 
to be equally willing to reciprocate regardless of the target (giver).  
Yet consistent with research indicating the influence of perceived motives on reciprocity, I 
predict that the relationship between individual-level prosociality and reciprocity is more 
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accurately explained by an inclination for prosocials to view others as altruistically motivated.16 
Research on the false consensus effect has demonstrated that people tend to overestimate the 
prevalence of their own preferences in the wider population (Ross, Greene and House 1977; 
Marks and Miller 1987; Dawes and Mulford 1996). This effect has been found to hold for a 
variety of preferences, including social value preferences (Iedema and Poppe 1994; Simpson and 
Willer 2008). Prosocials are thus more likely than proselfs to perceive others as altruistically 
motivated; conversely, proselfs are more likely than prosocials to view others as egoistically 
motivated. Prosociality may thus promote reciprocity not because of a general predisposition of 
selflessness, but because prosociality causes people to view others as prosocial. This suggests the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Prosocials will be more likely to perceive favor givers as altruistically 
motivated. 
Hypothesis 1b: Prosocials’ tendency to perceive favor givers as altruistically motivated 
will mediate (explain) the relationship between prosociality and willingness to 
reciprocate. 
Prosocials and proselfs may also differ in how they respond to particular attributions. While 
prosocials are more likely to view a given favor as altruistically motivated, they are also more 
likely to favorably respond to such an attribution (Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). Research on 
the “might-over-morality” hypothesis has demonstrated that prosocials view other prosocials in 
positive terms as moral and honest (Liebrand et al. 1986; Smeesters et al. 2003). By contrast, 
                                                
16 I use the term “altruistically-motivated” to refer to the intention to increase another’s welfare; “egoistically-
motivated,” by contrast, refers to the intention to increase one’s own welfare, regardless of the other. These 
definitions are similar to the prosocial/proself construct; however I use the altruism terminology to distinguish the 
perceived intentions of others from one’s own social value preferences. Importantly, perceived motivation is 
conceptualized as two-dimensional: a favor may be perceived as driven by both egoism and altruism. This study 
concerns the relative weight by which individuals perceive these respective motivations. 
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proselfs perceive prosocials as unintelligent and weak. This suggests an interaction between 
prosocial value preferences and perceived motives, as follows: 
Hypothesis 1c: Prosocial receivers of favors will be more willing to reciprocate than 
proself receivers when a favor giver is perceived to be altruistically motivated. By 
contrast, prosocial receivers will be less willing than proself receivers to reciprocate a 
favor perceived to be egoistically motivated. 
Group-level prosocial values. Social value preferences held at the group level are distinct 
from individual value preferences. For a value to be a “group value” or reflective of the group’s 
culture, it must be held by the majority of group members (O’Reilly and Chatman 1996). The 
potential influence of these values is reflected in O’Reilly and Chatman’s (1996) definition of 
organizational culture as “a system of shared values defining what is important, and norms, 
defining appropriate attitudes and behaviors, that guide members’ attitudes and behaviors.” 
Importantly, while some members may perceive their group’s culture as embodying different 
values than their own, such members may still be influenced by their group’s culture. As 
Chatman and Barsade (1995) note, a group’s culture “may help individuals anticipate other 
members’ likely reactions to their attitudes and behaviors.” This observation reflects the process 
of social learning, whereby people come to form expectations of others’ behavior by 
extrapolating from past experiences (Bandura 1977). These expectations can be particularly 
influential when individuals have ambiguous information about a particular situation at hand 
(Tesser, Campbell and Mickler 1983; Kelley 1967).  
As applied to this study, I predict workers will form judgments about prevailing norms 
based on their interactions with others in their group, and these judgments will set expectations 
for the behavior of new interaction partners. In this respect, I expect the relationship between 
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collectivism and reciprocity to be explained by the perceptions of collectivist group members 
that others are altruistically motivated (i.e. embodying group-level prosocial values). Thus, I 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2a: Members of groups emphasizing collectivistic values will be more likely 
to perceive a favor as altruistically motivated. 
Hypothesis 2b: The tendency for members of groups emphasizing collectivistic values to 
perceive favor givers as altruistically motivated will mediate (explain) the relationship 
between membership in such groups and willingness to reciprocate. 
Because a group’s shared values form expectations regarding other members’ behavior, I expect 
these predictions to hold even after controlling for group members’ prosocial value preferences 
at the individual level. 
Because members of interdependent groups must reciprocate favors to complete their 
routine tasks, I predict that members of such groups will be equally willing to reciprocate favors 
regardless of the motives they attribute to favor givers. Accordingly, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2c: Members of groups characterized by interdependent tasks will be equally 
willing to reciprocate regardless of the motives attributed to favor givers. 
Hypotheses 1a through 2b are illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Theoretical Model Illustrating Prosocial Values, Perceived Altruism, and Willingness to 
Reciprocate 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDY 
Research Setting, Sample, and Procedure 
I used quantitative survey data from 188 workers of a large multinational technology 
company to assess the degree to which perceived motives mediated the effects of both 
collectivism at the group level and prosocial value preferences at the individual level on workers’ 
willingness to reciprocate favors. To control for extraneous differences between coworkers that 
would likely exist if respondents were to think of specific individuals in their group, workers in 
the study engaged in a hypothetical exchange with two fictional coworkers from their group, 
described in two separate vignettes. Because all survey participants engaged in the same 
hypothetical exchanges, variation in response due to pre-existing person and situation factors 
could be assessed.  
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The site for this study was a large multinational technology company, referred to hereafter 
as GeoSoft, headquartered in California. GeoSoft was ideal as a field site for several reasons. 
First, because it is engaged in developing technology, a substantial portion of GeoSoft’s workers 
work on tasks requiring a high degree of interdependence. Some of these groups emphasize 
collectivistic values while others do not.17 Second, GeoSoft has similarly structured technology 
product teams located in the U.S., India, and the People's Republic of China, allowing for 
country-level comparisons that were expected to influence workers’ individual-level social value 
preferences – a key explanatory variable in the model. Importantly, GeoSoft has standardized 
policies and practices across its global operations, keeping country-level effects other than those 
specified in the model to a minimum. Third, there are several departments other than product 
teams where independent goals are prioritized above group goals, yet where collectivist norms 
may still be emphasized. This variation in both task interdependence and group-level prosocial 
values allowed me to investigate how the presence of these factors affected both the perceptions 
of favor-giver motives as well as workers’ willingness to reciprocate favors. 
 
Sample and Procedure 
To control for the effects of power, dependence, and organizational responsibility on 
perceived motives, the sample was limited to individual contributors (those without managerial 
responsibilities) and their managers.18 The target population was stratified along two dimensions: 
office location (country) and task interdependence (by group). The country-level stratification 
was intended to introduce greater expected variation of individual-level prosocial values, as 
                                                
17 These characteristics were described by members of GeoSoft’s Human Resources department and further 
corroborated by the subsequent survey. 
18 Managers who had other direct reports that were also managers were excluded (this rule prevented workers at the 
senior director level or above from participating). 
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studies by Van Lange and colleagues (1997) indicate that prosocial value preferences are more 
common in highly interdependent and collectivist societies, as in Asia.19 The stratification by 
task interdependence allowed for a comparison between groups that varied on this predictor. 
Group-level prosocial values were expected to moderately but not fully correlate with task 
interdependence, such that the sample was expected to contain a fully crossed set of groups 
marked by interdependence versus group-level prosocial (i.e. collectivistic) values.20 
Prior to the survey, a senior GeoSoft executive notified department managers of the 
upcoming survey and requested their cooperation. The executive then sent an electronic message 
to email distributions lists covering the target sample inviting the workers to complete the survey 
online. Workers were offered compensation for completing the survey. We emphasized the 
survey’s confidentiality by hosting the survey on a secured server, adopting my academic 
institution’s branding rather than GeoSoft’s, and providing follow-up contact information to my 
university’s Institutional Review Board at the outset of the survey. The combined distribution 
lists contained 742 subscribers. 243 workers responded, suggesting a response rate of 32.7%. As 
workers may have belonged to more than one distribution list, this response rate reflects a 
conservative estimate. While the survey was active, GeoSoft underwent an unannounced 
restructuring, resulting in a significant layoff of its workforce. No further surveys were submitted 
following the restructuring, thereby limiting the potential response rate. Of the 243 workers who 
submitted surveys, 55 were dropped due to missing data, yielding a usable sample of 188 
respondents (94 from the United States; 30 from India; and 64 from the PRC).21 Given the low 
                                                
19 The cross-national sample also allowed me to test whether collectivism at the national cultural level was 
influential in the theoretical model (no significant effects were found). 
20 I stratified the sample by task interdependence rather than group-level prosocial values because task 
interdependence could be more accurately and objectively assessed by the Human Resources personnel in my 
discussions with them prior to the survey.  
21 As demographic data was collected at the end of the survey, I was not able to compare whether these respondents 
differed from those in the final sample. 
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response rate, it is possible that bias due to self-selection may have influenced the results. If 
present, such bias would likely have reduced the variance in prosocial values at both the 
individual and group levels, resulting in a conservative statistical effect. 
 
Survey Design 
Prior to this study, I interviewed 18 GeoSoft workers from the United States and India 
branches to identify common coworker interactions and pilot test questions to be used in the 
survey. Surveys distributed to workers in the United States and India offices were written in 
English, as English is the spoken and written language at work in these branches. The survey 
distributed to PRC workers was translated into Chinese. Accuracy of all translated terms and 
phrasing was ensured through multiple iterations of back-translation (Brislin, Lonner and 
Thorndike 1973).  
The survey contained two vignettes, the descriptions of which were a composite of typical 
workplace interactions mentioned by employees during the preliminary interviews (see 
Appendix). Each vignette described details involving a colleague who has offered the respondent 
help with a particular task. After reading each vignette, respondents then answered a series of 
question concerning the ostensible motivations of the colleague and the respondents’ willingness 
to reciprocate help with the colleague in the future. To assess the ecological validity of each 
vignette, participants then rated the following statement on a 5-point Likert scale: “I could easily 
imagine this kind of scenario taking place in my group.” 
Using vignettes in this context provided a degree of experimental control while involving 
subjects and contextual factors particular to the field setting. This method eliminated the 
extraneous differences between coworkers that would likely have existed had respondents been 
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asked to think of specific colleagues from their group who have recently given them favors. Two 
vignettes were included rather than one to provide alternative contexts under which favors are 
given. The vignette characters’ motivations for providing a favor were deliberately ambiguous 
and could be explained by “two plausible stories” or some combination thereof: self-interest 
(egoism), altruism, or a combination of these motives (see Vargas et al. 2004 and Menon et al. 
1999 for similar designs). For each of the scenarios, respondents were asked to assess the relative 
likelihood of each rationale and answer related questions regarding the respondents’ willingness 
to reciprocate the favors. Unlike most vignettes in traditional lab experiments, the survey 
vignettes did not contain a manipulation. Following Vargus et al. (2004), differences in the 
dependent measures were attributed to pre-existing person-situation factors, namely the social 
value preferences of both the respondents and their respective groups.  
 
Measures 
Except where noted, all measures use a five-point Likert-type scale, anchored at 1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree. 
Prosocial values - individual level. Individual-level prosocial values were assessed using 
items from Grant’s (2008) measure of prosocial and intrinsic motivation and from Miller and 
Bersoff’s (1994) measure for perceived motivation. The corresponding prompt read, “When I 
help others in my group, I usually do so because…” Respondents rated the following four 
randomized responses: 1) “It is important to me to do good for others,” 2) “I genuinely care 
about benefiting others,” 3) “Helping others ultimately benefits me,” and 4) “I’m expected to 
help others.” I measured prosocial values by averaging the first two responses, as these 
statements reflect internalized intrinsic or value-driven other-regarding preferences. 
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Prosocial values - group level (collectivism). The measure for group-level prosocial values 
was derived from the Organizational Cultural Profile (OCP), developed by O’Reilly, Chatman, 
and Caldwell (1991). The OCP asks respondents to rate their agreement with a list of 
characteristics describing their group’s culture (described as “behaviors or ways of doing things 
that are generally accepted, valued, or rewarded within your group at GeoSoft”). Respondents 
rated the following seven items of the OCP associated with the individualism-collectivism 
dimension: collaborative, people-oriented, individually-demanding (reverse-scored), fair, 
competitive (reverse-scored), team-oriented, and supportive (Chatman and Spataro 2005).  
Task interdependence. The level of task interdependence corresponding to the respondent’s 
group was measured using three items adapted from Wageman, Hackman, and Lehman 2005. 
The first item asked, “Is the work in your group performed mainly by individuals or by the group 
as a whole?” (1 = “Each member has his or her own individual job to do; there is no real need for 
coordination among members; 5 = “The work is a real group effort, requiring a great deal of 
coordination among members”). The second item asked, “Are individuals in your group expected 
to help each other or to work things out on their own” (1 = “People are almost always expected 
to work things out on their own”; 5 = “People are almost always expected to help each other”). 
The third item asked, “Are individuals in your group evaluated primarily on progress towards 
individual goals or group goals? (Group goals require the contributions of others; individual 
goals do not).” (1 = “Evaluation is based primarily on progress towards individual goals,” 5 = 
“Evaluation is based primarily on progress towards group goals”). Responses to these three items 
were first standardized and then averaged. 
Perceived motives. I assessed respondents’ perception of the vignette coworkers’ motives 
using a measure similar to the one used for the respondents’ prosocial values. The prompt read as 
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follows: “Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following reasons for why 
[coworker name] may be motivated to help.” Respondents were asked to rate the following four 
randomized statements: 1) “Because it is important to [coworker name] to do good for others,” 2) 
“Because [coworker name] genuinely cares about my needs,” 3) “Because people are expected to 
help in my group,” 4) “Because [coworker name] is benefiting [himself/herself] by offering and 
providing me help.” Responses from the first two items were averaged and then standardized, 
yielding a measure of the respondent’s perception of the vignette character’s prosocial 
motivation. To further assess whether the respondent perceived the vignette coworkers’ favor as 
genuinely motivated by altruism, this measure was averaged with a standardized measure of 
sincerity adapted from Larzelere and Huston’s (1980) dyadic trust scale, which asked 
respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement of the following statement, “[coworker 
name] is likely sincere.” 
Willingness to reciprocate. I adopted Ames et al.’s (2004) measure for willingness to 
reciprocate to assess respondents’ willingness to reciprocate each vignette coworker’s favor. 
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with the statement, “I’d be 
willing to do a favor for [coworker name] in the future.”  
Control variables. While the gender of the vignette characters was randomized, I also 
controlled for the respondents’ sex to eliminate potential bias due to same-sex or opposite-sex 
pairings. I also controlled for the respondents’ ethnicity to ensure any variance in prosocial 
values introduced by ethnicity could not be attributed to extraneous factors related to ethnicity. 
Lastly, research on general trust suggests that individuals with high levels of generalized trust 
may be more inclined to reciprocate with strangers, such as new members of a worker’s group 
(Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Generalized trust, while expected to be strongly correlated 
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with prosocial value preferences, is conceptually distinct. Generalized trust reflects a proclivity 
to trust unknown others, whereas prosocial value preferences refer to a desire for outcomes that 
benefit others (in addition to benefitting the self). Generalized trust was added as a control as a 
robust test that the effects of individual-level prosocial values were not due to a possibly related 
predisposition for generally trusting others. I adopted the standard measure for generalized trust 
used in the General Social Survey (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted, or that you can’t be too careful dealing with people”; Glaeser et al. 2000). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 4.1 reports means, standard deviations, and correlations among the primary variables 
in the model. While I had included a cross-national sample to maximize variance in social value 
orientation, the direction of correlation between social value orientation and country was 
opposite of predictions suggesting that prosocial values are more common among Asians than 
non-Asians (cf. Van Lange et al. 1997). Among GeoSoft workers, Asians were less likely to 
report prosocial values than non-Asians. This discrepancy appears due in large part to the 
significant variance in age across the two ethnicity categories. In their 1997 study, Van Lange 
and colleagues found empirical support for their hypothesis that age and prosocial values should 
be positively correlated.  Among GeoSoft workers, more than half of the Asian workers were 
under 30 years of age; by contrast, the majority of non-Asian workers were over 30, with nearly 
half over the age of 41. After controlling for age, workers’ ethnicity loses significance as a 
predictor of prosocial values (β = –.07, n.s.). 
Across both vignettes, more than 75% of respondents indicated they could imagine the 
scenarios described occurring in their group (mean = 3.84; SD =.76). Respondents however rated 
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Scenario 2 as more likely to occur in their group than Scenario 1 (Scenario 1 mean = 3.69 vs. 
Scenario 2 mean = 4.00, t = -4.67, p<.001, two-tailed). As the majority of respondents indicated 
both scenarios could realistically occur in their group, responses to the post-vignette questions 
were averaged together for the analyses discussed below. 
I used ordinary least squares regression to test the main hypotheses in the study; results are 
reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
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TABLE 4.1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
Variable Mean SD 1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Sex             
Male  56.76%           
Female  43.24%           
2. Age   .14         
18 - 30 34.76%           
31 – 40 40.11%           
41+ 25.13%           
3. Ethnicity   -.18* -.53*        
American 45.16%           
Asian 54.84%           
4. General trust 1.35 .75 .06 .03 .11       
5. Prosocial values - individual 4.23 .67 -.07 .17* -.17* .22*      
6. Prosocial values - group 3.44 .57 -.07 .02 .01 .16* .34*     
7. Task interdependence .00 .99 -.12 -.19* .31* .19* .06 .28*    
8. Perceived motive (altruistic) -.02 .98 .05 .06 .03 .37* .34* .41* .19*   
9. Positive anticipation 4.06 .57 -.04 -.13 .10 .18* .20* .29* .31* .56*  
10. Willingness to reciprocate 4.18 .56 -.01 -.03 -.03 .17* .22* .26* .19* .55* .68* 
* p<0.05 
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TABLE 4.2 
Results of the Standardized Regression Analysis Predicting the Effects of Prosocial Values 
on Perceived Altruism 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female) .06 .06 .04 .08 
Ethnicity (0 = American; 1 = Asian) .05 .00 -.05 .03 
General trust .29 *** .31 *** .34 *** .26 *** 
Prosocial values - individual (PV-I) .28 ***   .19 ** 
Prosocial values - group (PV-G)  .36 ***  .30 *** 
Task interdependence   .15 * .05 
R2 .20  .26 .15 .29 
Adjusted R2 .18 .25 .13 .26 
Overall F 11.13 15.93 8.04 11.87 
df 4, 178 4, 180 4, 180 6, 176 
Beta coefficients are standardized.         
+ ≤.10         
* p ≤.05          
** p ≤.01         
*** p ≤.001         
All tests are one-tailed.         
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TABLE 4.3 
Results of the Standardized Regression Analysis Predicting the Mediating Effects of Perceived Motives on Willingness to 
Reciprocate 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7  
Sex (0 = Male; 1 = Female) -.01 -.02 -.02 -.05 .01 -.04 -.05 
Ethnicity (0 = American; 1 = Asian) -.01 -.06 -.12 + -.06 -.05 -.07 -.07 
General trust .13 * .13 * .13 * -.05 .10 -.05 -.04 
Prosocial values - individual (PV-I) .18 *    .12 + .01 .04 
Prosocial values - group (PV-G)  .22 **   .15 * -.01 -.01 
Task interdependence   .20 **  .13 * .10 + .13 * 
Perceived motive (altruistic)    .56 ***  .56 *** .52 *** 
PV-I x Perceived motive       .18 ** 
R2 .06  .07  .06  .30  .10  .32  .35  
Adjusted R2 .04 .05 .04 .28 .07 .30 .32 
Overall F 2.69 3.61 2.98 19.31 3.37 11.97 11.9 
df 4, 178 4, 180 4, 180 4, 180 6, 176 7, 175 8, 174 
Beta coefficients are standardized.               
+ ≤.10               
* p ≤.05                
** p ≤.01               
*** p ≤.001               
All tests are one-tailed.               
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Effects of perceived motives. To test the mediating effect of perceived motive, I followed 
the procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). They argued that three conditions must 
be upheld to demonstrate full mediation. First, both the mediating variable (perceived motive) 
and the independent variable (prosocial values) must be significantly related to the dependent 
variable (willingness to reciprocate) when regressed separately. As shown in Table 4.3, this 
condition is supported by the data. Workers were significantly more willing to reciprocate when 
the vignette coworkers were perceived to be altruistically motivated (Model 4, β =.56, p ≤.001). 
Workers in groups characterized by prosocial values were significantly more willing to 
reciprocate favors (Model 5, β =.15, p ≤.05). When regressed in isolation, individual-level 
prosociality was significantly related to willingness to reciprocate (Model 1, β =.18, p ≤.05), 
however this relationship diminished somewhat after controlling for group-level prosocial values 
and task interdependence (Model 5, β =.12, p ≤.10). This is likely due to the significant 
interaction effect between individual-level prosocial values and perceived motive (Model 7, β 
=.18, p ≤.01; discussed below).  
Second, the relationship between the independent variable and the mediating variable must 
also be significant. This condition is also supported by the data, as shown in Table 4.2. As 
predicted in Hypothesis 1a, prosocial workers were more likely to perceive the fictional 
coworker’s favor as altruistically motivated (Model 4, β =.19, p ≤.01). Respondents in groups 
emphasizing collectivistic values were also more likely to perceive favors as altruistically 
motivated, as predicted in Hypothesis 2a (Model 4, β =.30, p ≤.001). Notably, this analysis 
included controls for individual-level prosocial values as well as the level of task 
interdependence of the respondents’ group. 
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Third, the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable must 
lose significance when the mediating variable is added to the model. If this condition, along with 
the previous two, holds, then the mediating variable is said to “explain” the relationship between 
the independent variable and dependent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). Table 4.3 illustrates 
support for this condition. As predicted in Hypothesis 1b, perceived motive mediated the 
relationship between individual-level prosocial values and respondents’ willingness to 
reciprocate. This mediation effect is demonstrated by the loss of significance for individual-level 
prosocial values when perceive motive is added to the full model (Model 5, β =.12, p ≤.10; 
Model 7, β =.04, n.s.). This indicates that prosocial respondents’ increased willingness to 
reciprocate favors can be explained by their inclination to perceive favor givers as altruistically 
motivated. Correspondingly, Hypothesis 2b predicted that perceived motive would mediate the 
relationship between group-level prosocial values and respondents’ willingness to reciprocate. 
This hypothesis was supported as well, as indicated by the loss of significance for group-level 
prosocial values when perceived motive is added to the regression equation (Model 5, β =.15, p 
≤.05; Model 7, β = -.01, n.s.). The tendency for respondents in groups emphasizing collectivistic 
values to perceive favors as altruistically motivated explains why these respondents were more 
willing to reciprocate than those in groups which do not emphasize such values. 
By contrast, Hypothesis 2c predicted that perceived motives would not mediate the 
relationship between a respondent group’s level of task interdependence and the respondent’s 
willingness to reciprocate. In other words, respondents in groups marked by task 
interdependence were expected to be equally willing to reciprocate favors regardless of the 
motive they attribute to favor givers. This hypothesis was also supported. Model 5 (Table 4.3) 
indicates that task interdependence was a significant predictor of respondents’ willingness to 
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reciprocate (β =.13, p ≤.05), yet the significance remains when perceived motives is added in the 
full model (Model 7, β =.13, p ≤.05). Moreover, while members of groups emphasizing 
collectivistic values were more likely to perceive others as altruistic, this was not the case for 
interdependent groups. After controlling for the respondents’ individual and group-level 
prosocial value preferences, Table 4.2 indicates respondents in groups marked by task 
interdependence were no more likely to attribute altruistic motives than egoistic motives (Model 
4, β =.05, n.s.). 
Interaction effect. Hypothesis 1c predicted an interaction effect between individual-level 
prosocial values and perceived motive on respondents’ willingness to reciprocate. In other 
words, prosocials who attributed altruistic motives to favor givers were predicted to be more 
willing to reciprocate than proselfs who similarly attributed altruistic motives; by contrast, 
prosocials who attributed egoistic motives to favor givers were predicted to be less willing to 
reciprocate than proselfs who attributed egoistic motives. This hypothesis was supported, as 
indicated by the significant interaction effect in Table 4.3 (Model 7, β =.18, p ≤.01). Figure 4.2 
illustrates this effect using the method described by Aiken and West (1991) while keeping the 
control variables in the analysis. While the overall interaction effect is significant, the difference 
between prosocials’ and proselfs’ willingness to reciprocate is only significant when the favor 
giver is perceived to be altruistic (t = 2.50, p ≤.01) rather than when the favor giver is perceived 
to be egoistic (t = 1.10, n.s.). 
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FIGURE 4.2 
Interaction effect of Perceived Motive and Individual-Level Prosocial Values on 
Respondents’ Willingness to Reciprocate 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
I found empirical support for the mediating role of perceived motives in the relationship 
between prosocial values and willingness to reciprocate. As expected, prosocial values at both 
the individual and group levels were associated with respondents’ increased willingness to 
reciprocate favors. Prosocial workers were also more likely to perceive favor givers as 
altruistically motivated, even when controlling for prosocial values at the group level. Similarly, 
members of groups emphasizing prosocial (collectivistic) values were more likely to perceive 
favor givers as altruistically motivated, even when controlling for prosocial values at the 
individual level. The tendency for those holding prosocial values at either level to view favor 
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givers as altruistically motivated explained the relationship between prosocial values and 
willingness to reciprocate. 
This study provides empirical support that prosocial values are not indicative of a 
generalized selflessness; rather, prosocial values may shape the lens by which adherents view 
others. Such other-perceptions in turn may promote prosocial behavior. In particular, this study 
investigated the possibility that the relationship between prosocial values and reciprocity can be 
explained by the propensity for those holding prosocial values to view others as altruistically 
motivated. Since people tend to reciprocate more with others who appear to be motivated by 
altruism, favor receivers with prosocial motives at either the individual or group level are more 
inclined to reciprocate.  
These findings suggest the importance of perceived motives in social exchange. Most social 
exchange research has not considered the effects of such perceptions. One exception is Hechter’s 
(1987) work on solidarity. Hechter suggests that prosocial motives may help reduce monitoring 
costs. For example, if it is known that you are prosocial, others can expect your cooperation 
without overseeing your behavior or incurring costs of enforcement. One implication of the 
current study is that possessing altruistic motives confers other advantages as well: not only are 
others more likely to reciprocate with such individuals, but those holding prosocial values are 
more likely to perceive others as altruistically motivated – and this in turn affects the quality of 
relationships and productivity. Another implication is that this dynamic can result not just 
through possessing internalized prosocial motives, but also by belonging to a group that 
emphasizes prosocial values, even if one does not subscribe to these values oneself. In short, 
context matters.  
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While workers characterized by prosocial values at either the individual or group level were 
equally likely to perceive others as altruistically motivated, the underlying mechanisms are likely 
different for individual-level versus group-level prosocial values. Research on the false 
consensus effect suggests that people tend to overestimate the degree to which others share their 
own values. While this may explain why prosocials tended to view favor givers as altruistically 
motivated, it does not explain the same perceptions for members of groups emphasizing 
collectivistic values. Rather, members of collectivist groups may be more likely to perceive 
others as altruistically motivated through a process of social learning. Even for group members 
who do not hold internalized prosocial value preferences, people in collectivist groups may come 
to expect altruistic motives based on prior experiences within the group environment. Because a 
majority within the group shares these values, group members come to form expectations that 
others within the group will hold such values, unless there is sufficient evidence to the contrary. 
One area of future research is to further investigate the conditions under which group members 
who have not internalized widely shared group-level value preferences nevertheless “project” 
these value preferences onto others. 
 
Managerial Implications 
This research has practical implications for organizations seeking to improve their 
workgroup productivity. If reciprocity is attenuated by perceptions of favor givers’ self-interest 
and facilitated by receivers’ prosocial values, it may be more important for organizations to 
screen for prosocial values rather than to rely more exclusively on situational factors that 
promote teamwork. Organizations that do not screen for such person-level value preferences will 
have mixed populations of prosocials and proselfs. Such heterogeneity may be more problematic 
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for groups emphasizing collectivistic values than for groups that feature interdependent tasks, as 
the members of the former will be more sensitive to motives when exchanging favors. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Because no behavioral measure of reciprocity was used, a positive relationship between self-
reported willingness to reciprocate and actual reciprocity has been assumed. Future studies could 
test the hypotheses with actual exchanges in more controlled conditions, perhaps by pairing 
workers in sequential prisoners’ dilemma games that simulate favor exchange. Such studies 
would need to account for the magnitude of the resources exchanged, as prior research has 
indicated perceived motives may play a less substantial role in reciprocating very large favors 
(Ames et al. 2004). 
Given the difference in my results for interdependence versus group-level prosocial values, 
one implication of the findings is the importance of distinguishing among various definitions of 
collectivism in studies of group culture. Many studies of collectivism conflate a group’s degree 
of task interdependence with prosocial value orientation. Yet these dimensions are conceptually 
independent and are measured quite differently. While task interdependence can be more 
objectively assessed by outside observers, assessing a group’s values requires a more informed 
inventory. One limitation of my study is that collectivism was self-reported. While prior research 
has shown high correlations between self-report measures and management-reported measures of 
collectivism, future studies could employ more robust measures of collectivism by using group 
members’ aggregated assessments of their culture (Chatman and Barsade 1995; cf. Chatman and 
Spataro 2005). 
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In the present study, favor exchange was analyzed between individuals who lack a 
relationship history, thereby eliminating confounding effects related to reputation. Moreover, the 
propensity for future interaction (the “shadow of the future”) was ambiguous. Workers would 
likely interact with this individual again, but not necessarily so – a context that mirrors many 
exchanges within large organizations. A wide range of research on social dilemmas indicates that 
people’s strategies for cooperation may differ depending on the likelihood of future interaction 
(cf. Axelrod 1980). Future research could examine whether perceived motives matter to the same 
degree in ongoing relationships.  
On a related note, motives perceived in one exchange may be influential in future exchanges 
with others. Research on negotiations has shown that performance in past negotiations influences 
one’s performance in future negotiations with other partners (O’Connor, Arnold and Burris 
2005). Similarly, research on indirect reciprocity has demonstrated that people reciprocate more 
with others who have behaved altruistically in previous exchanges (Simpson and Willer 2008). 
These studies suggest that perceptions of motives may have contagion effects. If proselfs tend to 
perceive others as egoistically motivated, reciprocity is diminished, with a corresponding 
attenuation in trust and solidarity. Conversely, reciprocity is reinforced when individuals and 
groups characterized by prosocial values view others as altruistically motivated. Future research 
might examine potential contagion effects of such perceptions in exchange networks.  
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APPENDIX 
SCENARIO 122. Please read and consider the following:  
You’ve been working hard on an upcoming presentation that requires you to share your 
work for the first time with a group of senior directors. If you do well, it may help your chances 
to temporarily fill in for a senior coworker while he’s away for three months (this would allow 
you to earn greater pay without much additional responsibility). But because you’re not familiar 
with your audience, you’re having a difficult time preparing for the presentation.  
[Scott / Nicole]23, another experienced employee who is also being considered to fill in 
for the senior colleague, has recently joined your group and has experience presenting to the 
senior directors. [Scott / Nicole] knows the directors’ expectations. After hearing from a 
coworker about your presentation, he stays late one day to help you for a few hours. 
---------- 
SCENARIO 2.  Please read and consider the following: 
You’ve been working hard on a project for the last several weeks.  It is taking longer than 
expected because you are unfamiliar with ProWare, a software package required to complete the 
project.  You mention this at Tuesday’s weekly group meeting. The group meeting is attended by 
the other members of your group, your manager, and the vice president of your department, who 
has dropped in to hear how things are going.   
[Scott / Nicole], another member of your group, speaks up at the meeting and says that he 
would be more than happy to help out. Afterwards, [Scott / Nicole] spends a few hours working 
with you to solve some of the ProWare issues you’re having. 
                                                
22 The order of these two scenarios was randomized. 
23 The coworker’s name for the first scenario was randomly selected from this pair; the 
unselected name was then used in the second scenario. The names used in the India and China 
surveys were culturally appropriate for those locales. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
As focused arenas where social structure and individual agency come together, organizations 
are rife with incentives that contend with people’s values and influence people’s self-
presentations (Baumeister 1989; Hochschild 1983). Motivated by this observation, this 
dissertation has investigated what happens when institutionalized incentives inform routine 
social interactions, such as reciprocal exchanges between coworkers. To gain purchase on this 
inquiry, I cast light on the hazy terrain of authenticity and sincerity, clarifying these terms while 
situating them in a broader empirical literature. I then examined existing theories of reciprocity, 
noting how they neglect to address the human ability to distinguish behavior from the motives 
that underlie such behavior. I developed a complementary theory of reciprocity whereby 
people’s ability to distinguish between behavior and motives is predicted to influence cohesion 
between exchange partners. I hypothesized that this cohesion in turn not only informs recipients’ 
reciprocity, but transcends initial encounters to influence recipients’ generosity towards their 
partners in subsequent interactions. These predictions received empirical support in the online 
experiment reported in Chapter 3. 
Having demonstrated the importance of perceived motives in reciprocal exchange, I 
investigated personal and situational factors irrespective of favor givers themselves that may 
shape such perceptions. In particular, I developed and tested a theory predicting that perceptions 
of sincerity are informed by (a) individual differences in recipients’ social value preferences (e.g. 
proself, prosocial) and (b) situational differences in the collectivism of a recipient’s group. These 
predictions were supported by cross-cultural survey data I collected from employees in a large 
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multinational firm. The results were also consistent with the hypothesis that prosocial value 
preferences at the individual level moderate the degree to which perceived sincerity manifests as 
increased reciprocity. Lastly, I found support for the further prediction that perceived sincerity 
mediates the relationship between prosocial values and reciprocity.  
The findings from these two empirical studies shed new light on existing theories of 
reciprocity in two important ways. First, this research challenges normative and genetic theories 
of reciprocity that merely attend to the observable mechanics of exchange. In particular, both the 
norm of reciprocity and reciprocal altruism lack the explanatory breadth to account for 
recipients’ future generosity toward favor givers beyond a focal exchange. Rather, these 
explanations suggest that upon restoring equity to the relationship by reciprocating, recipients 
have “resolved” the exchange; following the focal exchange, recipients should thus exhibit the 
same degree of commitment towards their exchange partner as if the focal exchange had never 
taken place. Moreover, both the norm of reciprocity and reciprocal altruism emphasize how the 
potential payback of giving makes the giving of favors worthwhile. Yet this logic assumes an 
intention of egoism, an intention that paradoxically limits reciprocity if perceived by recipients. 
In other words, the norm of reciprocity—when made salient by perceiving the payback drive of 
the giver—actually impedes reciprocity. The reciprocity model offered in this dissertation moves 
beyond these behaviorist explanations to account for the impact of such perceptions on exchange 
outcomes. In accounting for this impact, more accurate predictions can be made with respect to 
exchange outcomes and the development of long-term cohesion. 
Second, this research challenges the widely held perspective that prosocial values and 
group collectivism reflect a general concern for others. I find support for an alternative argument, 
namely that prosocial values held by individuals or groups promote reciprocity not because such 
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values reflect a general selflessness, but because such values inform how the motivations of 
others are perceived. At the individual level, prosocial values are routinely framed as an aversion 
to equity imbalance. This framing suggests that prosocials are more inclined than proselfs to feel 
obligated to return a favor after one has been given, so as to restore equity in the relationship. In 
other words, prosocials may be more apt than proselfs to adhere to the norm of reciprocity 
(Perugini et al. 2003; Lester, Meglino and Korsgaard 2008). Yet if prosocials are more willing to 
reciprocate than proselfs because they are more sensitive to equity imbalances, then we would 
expect prosocials to be equally willing to reciprocate regardless of the target giver. Similarly, 
members of collectivist groups are commonly thought to prioritize group goals over individual 
goals. If this were the case, we would likewise expect members of collectivist groups to be 
equally willing to reciprocate regardless of the giver.  
Yet findings from the study in Chapter 4 suggest otherwise. Given that recipients holding 
prosocial values at the individual or group level appear to project these values onto favor givers, 
recipients are more likely to reciprocate—not because they are generally more selfless, but 
because they are more likely to perceive their partners’ helpfulness as altruistically motivated. 
Since people reciprocate more in general with those having altruistic intentions (as illustrated in 
Chapter 3), people holding prosocial values inevitably reciprocate more. Importantly however, 
such reciprocity occurs under recipients’ assumption that givers share their prosocial values. 
When prosocial recipients encounter favor givers who seem egoistically motivated, such 
recipients actually reciprocate at lower levels than proself recipients. As argued in Chapter 4, 
these findings suggest the importance of screening for prosocial values when forming groups, 
rather than relying on extrinsic incentives to promote teamwork. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I discuss potential areas of future research with respect to perceived 
sincerity in reciprocal exchange. I thus now return to the arena of authenticity and sincerity more 
generally, suggesting four areas of potential research that warrant further inquiry. 
 
Macro-micro Investigations 
With respect to global trends, such as urbanization, increased mobility, and virtual 
communication, the study of authenticity and sincerity will be of increasing concern going 
forward, yet the nature of this macro-micro intersection remains unclear. At present, virtually no 
work exists on the micro-macro link between authenticity, sincerity, and macro-level 
phenomena. With respect to the macro-micro link, several questions remain. Will authenticity be 
facilitated by an increase in options to pursue self-values, or will it be impeded by the 
increasingly complex social contexts brought about by globalization? Will people develop 
greater tolerance for inconsistencies between self-presentation and self-concept (both from the 
POV of the self and the observer), or will globalizing trends bring a need for stronger 
authentication standards and measures? Answers to such questions will no doubt fuel the need 
for more micro-level studies of authenticity.  
 
The Intersection of Authenticity and Sincerity 
Investigating authenticity and sincerity together rather than in isolation likely reveals how 
they function. The creation of the self-concept, for instance, is a dynamic process, occurring 
within an ongoing interplay of social interactions, one of which is the authentication process. In 
the authentication process, people are judged by the perceived verity of their self-presentations; 
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these judgments in turn likely inform the self-concept and one’s feelings of authenticity. 
Furthermore, the self-concept can inform the authentication process, as when employees project 
their self-values onto their colleagues and deduce sincerity accordingly (see Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation). Further research could investigate the influence of other types of self-values on the 
authentication process, such as one’s own capacity or comfort for dissemblance. 
More research is also needed to better understand the link between insincere self-
presentation and inauthenticity suggested by studies of emotional labor. Given the stark portrait 
of economically disadvantaged workers in the service sector compromising their authenticity to 
pay the bills, research on emotional labor has contributed to a broader sociological understanding 
of the fallout of economic inequality (Schwalbe et al. 2000). But the impact of emotional labor 
on authenticity is not well understood. For instance, inauthenticity may be less likely to result 
from insincere self-presentations in interactions between strangers, relative to those with 
coworkers or friends (Kádár and Mills 2011). Along these lines, perhaps some forms of insincere 
self-presentation strategies (such as insincere facial signals) may be less apt to weaken privately 
felt authenticity than other forms (such as insincere verbal statements), just as deep acting is less 
likely to negatively affect authenticity than surface acting. Moreover, more research is needed to 
understand both directions of the causal link between sincere self-presentation and authenticity. 
Do sincere self-presentations yield greater felt authenticity? Conversely, are people who feel 
authentic more sincere, or are they more apt to engage in insincere self-presentations given their 
own comfort? Because self-presentation can in turn influence others’ behavior, investigation into 
these questions may yield insight into how and whether feelings of authenticity are prone to 
diffusion across networks.  
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Self-Concept Anchorage 
A third area warranting further research concerns self-concept anchorage. As with other 
personality typologies, self-concept anchorage is meaningful insofar as it reflects a 
transituational quality with micro and/or macro-level consequences. Certainly more long-term 
studies are needed to assess the robustness of anchorage over time and place. With respect to its 
consequence, I believe distinguishing between impulsive and institutional anchorages may yield 
productive findings for organizational behavior and institutional design more broadly. With 
respect to institutional design, Turner (1976) argued different mechanisms of social control are 
needed for institutionals versus impulsives. Current social control methods—with their emphasis 
on internalization and enforcement of norms and values—appear to assume a populace with an 
institutional anchorage. While norm enforcement may be effective for institutionals who see 
norms as an opportunity to act on their values (e.g. integrity, patriotism), other means are 
required for impulsives, who see norms as cramping the expression of the true self. Further 
research is needed to identify what these means might be. 
Scholarship on person-organization fit could use authenticity measures (e.g. Kernis and 
Goldman’s [2006] Authenticity Inventory) as a key indicator for assessing fit, with self-concept 
anchorage distinctions providing additional insight into the alignment between person and 
organizational values. In this respect, impulsives may represent a particular challenge in 
institutionalized settings, given their desire to be free of role obligations. Sloan (2007) found that 
impulsives are indeed more likely to feel inauthentic (and correspondingly burned out with their 
jobs) in workplace settings in general, yet her survey of state employees aggregated a vast array 
of roles and contexts. Further research could help identify the work contexts in which impulsives 
can feel authentic while nevertheless operating in a bureaucratic structure.  
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With respect to authenticating peers, variation in self-concept anchorage could help 
explain how and when people differ in their interpretations of others self-presentations. For 
instance, if self-concept anchorage is prone to the false consensus effect, then impulsives may be 
more apt to see others who enthusiastically embody social norms as insincere, since impulsives 
would be projecting their own authenticity desires onto others. Similarly, institutionals may have 
difficulty understanding others who seek freedom from institutional constraints, since 
institutionals feel most at home in such conditions.  
More research is also needed to understand what causes anchorages to form. Are 
anchorages passed on genetically, or are they a response to cultural upbringing? Or are they 
merely reflective of an individual’s current social circumstances? Impulsives feel most authentic 
when acting free of social obligations, norms, and other social structural constraints—i.e. the 
same environmental conditions in which institutionals thrive and feel most at home. Perhaps 
institutionals are more apt to internalize external norms such that the locus of causality feels 
internal rather than external when adhering to them. If this is the case, institutionals (in contrast 
to impulsives) may simply be functioning in environments where their psychological needs of 
autonomy, competence, and connectedness are being met, as these are the conditions by which 
extrinsic norms are most likely to be integrated with the self (Ryan and Deci 2000). Further 
research is needed to test such a claim. 
 
Flexible Self-Conceptions 
The fourth area of potential research concerns the robustness of the true self as it is 
subjectively conceived. Post-modernists have critiqued the idea of the true self, arguing that self-
conceptions are mere social constructs (Gergen 1991). Turner (1976) and others have responded 
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by suggesting that whether or not there is a true self is irrelevant—what matters is that people 
perceive there is a true self. Yet recent research on self-construal (Cross, Gore and Morris 2003) 
suggests that the post-modernist critique applies to self-perceptions as well, since many 
individuals hold disparate, relationally-contingent identities that may all “feel” authentic. If 
people can manage multiple true selves, further research is needed to understand how people 
resolve these identities when they appear to be in conflict within a particular situation. English 
and Chen (2007) suggest that culture plays a critical role. In their study of cultural influences on 
self-concept stability, they found that Asian-Americans are more prone to holding context-
specific self-views relative to European-Americans. Furthermore, authenticity for Asian-
Americans was experienced as remaining true to established relational identities rather than 
feeling aligned with a more unified self-concept. English and Chen attribute these cultural 
disparities to the “dialecticism” of East Asian culture—i.e. its acceptance of contradiction and 
change.  
Cultural variation in how authenticity is experienced also raises questions about the 
generalizability of research on emotional labor. Most studies of emotional labor have been 
conducted in western countries, where the effects of post-industrialization (including the increase 
of women in the workforce) in the latter half of the twentieth century have been most prominent. 
Now that East Asian countries are experiencing similar trends, new research on emotional labor 
in these contexts is needed. For instance, it is unclear whether the negative effects attributed to 
emotional labor may be mitigated by the more relationally contingent view of the self-concept 
among East Asian populations. More research is also needed to better understand the cultural 
factors responsible for more socially malleable self-conceptions. To what degree, for instance, 
does a population’s heterogeneity with respect to values, ethnicity, etc. reify self-conceptions or 
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alternatively make them more flexible? 
With respect to learning, Lerner’s (1993) observation that imitation is necessary for 
discovery suggests that flexible self-conceptions may facilitate the learning process. In the 
experiments conducted by Lenton et al. (2012), participants were asked to describe situations 
where they experienced feeling inauthentic. The article provided two example descriptions given 
by participants, both of which were situations where the participant was in a new situation that 
he or she had not yet mastered (one was a job interview, the other was a student’s first day at 
university). Additional research could investigate this potential link between experiencing 
inauthenticity and learning, the results of which could raise awareness about the risk-reward 
balance of discovery.  
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